


# The Challenge of Shadow Banking

Marcus Stanley


Policy Director

Americans for Financial Reform

# How Did We Go From This...




# And This...



# To This?

## The Shadow Ranking System

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The Public Service Staff of New York, November 2008



Source: Shadow Ranking System, Action, Ashcroft, Society (2010)

And what should we do about it?

# The Growth of Shadow Banking

- In 1970: 80 percent of financial sector liabilities were 'traditional' regulated liabilities like bank deposits, checking accounts, and insurance company reserves.
- By 2007: only 40 percent of financial sector liabilities were 'traditional'.

# Differences From Commercial Banking

- Just like commercial banking, shadow banking converts illiquid, risky, long-term assets into 'safe', liquid assets convertible to cash on short notice.
- But does it through market mediated credit.
  - From risks that are held to risks that are sold.
- Much longer, more complex credit chains.
  - Many unregulated non-banks, but banks play key role.

# Key 'Shadow Banking' Markets

- Securitization markets >> real economy credit.
  - Replacing own-book commercial bank lending.
- Securities lending markets >> within financial sector flows.
  - Replacing unsecured interbank, Fed lending.
- Derivatives markets >> risk transfer.
- Commercial paper.



# Shadow Banking: Why Worry?

- Market mediated credit is just as old and just as traditional as commercial banking.
- Spreads risk and allows fine-tuning of assets to investor preferences, increasing credit availability.
- Government-supported secondary mortgage markets date from Depression.
  - Bear certain similarities to ‘shadow banking’ and worked well for many years.

# Shadow Banking: Why To Worry

- Extended credit intermediation chains multiply opportunities for fraud, deception.
  - Complexity undermines market discipline.
- Complexity conceals and heightens leverage.
- Pro-cyclical linkage to market prices.
- Result: financial fragility, boom-bust cycles.

# Shadow Banking And the Safety Net

- Risk conversion relies on private guarantees.
  - Guarantees from ‘too big to fail’ institutions.
  - Supposedly ‘safe’ collateral. Subordination.
- Private safety net is systemically unreliable.
- Systemic event creates major pressure on government to back private guarantees.
- Private sector expansion of implicit safety net undermines market discipline.

# The Challenge To Regulation

- Measurement and oversight of risk.
- Ease of arbitrage when risks move between regulated and unregulated sector.
- Difficulty defining bounds of the safety net.

# The Dodd Frank Act Does Not Fully Address These Issues

- Important areas of shadow banking completely omitted from DFA.
  - Regulatory efforts on securities lending, money market funds, slow and inadequate so far.
  - Division between market and prudential regulators a problem.
- Dodd Frank Act ambivalent on the safety net.
- Capital rules still permit extensive risk transfer.
- Office of Financial Research – a mixed record.

# Some Key Questions

- How far will regulation of the large dealer banks take us?
  - TBTF banks were at the center of the shadow banking system, but other central dealers and guarantors could emerge.
- Designation of non-banks – asset managers?
- How to ensure private market discipline?

# Some Broader Thoughts

- Need to end the complexity bias in our regulatory system. Lean against forms of ‘financial innovation’ that promise risk transfer benefits but increase fragility.
- Examine increased support for commercial banking model of on-book lending.