The preamble to the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)\(^1\) declares that one of the statute’s primary purposes is “to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”\(^2\) When President Obama signed Dodd–Frank into law, he declared that the statute would create “the strongest consumer financial protections in history.”

In order to implement and enforce Dodd–Frank’s new protections for consumers, Congress created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“CFPB”) as an “independent bureau” within the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”).\(^3\) President Obama explained that CFPB will operate as “a new consumer watchdog with just one job: looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders, not investment houses—looking out for people as they interact with the financial system.”\(^4\) Similarly, the Senate committee report on Dodd–Frank explained that CFPB’s mission

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\(^2\) Id. at Preamble (describing the purposes of Dodd–Frank).


is to “help protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts that so often trap them in unaffordable financial products.”

Thus, Congress gave CFPB “the Herculean task of regulating the financial services industry to protect consumers.” Congress sought to increase CFPB’s “accountability” for that mission by delegating to CFPB the combined authority of seven federal agencies that were previously responsible for protecting consumers of financial services.

Congress determined that a single federal authority dedicated to protecting consumers of financial services was needed in light of “the spectacular failure of the [federal] prudential regulators to protect average American homeowners from risky, unaffordable” mortgages during the housing boom that led to the current financial crisis. As stated in the Senate report, federal banking agencies “routinely sacrificed consumer protection” while adopting policies that promoted the “short-term profitability” of large banks, nonbank mortgage lenders and Wall Street securities firms. The Senate report concluded that “it was the failure by the [federal] prudential regulators to give sufficient consideration to consumer protection that helped bring the financial system down.”

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8 Id. at 15; see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Bureau will have the authority and accountability to ensure that existing consumer protection laws and regulations are comprehensive, fair, and vigorously enforced”), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730.
As explained in Part II of this paper, the financial services industry and most Republican members of Congress vigorously opposed the creation of CFPB. During the debates on Dodd-Frank, industry trade groups and Republican legislators argued that CFPB was likely to impose burdensome regulations that would reduce the availability of credit to consumers. CFPB’s opponents also maintained that the consumer protection function should remain with federal banking agencies in order to prevent consumer safeguards from undermining the safety and soundness of financial institutions. Opponents further charged that CFPB would have unprecedented freedom to operate without meaningful checks and balances. Accordingly, they alleged, CFPB would likely become an all-powerful bureaucracy that would stifle innovation and flexibility in consumer financial services.

Republicans failed to stop Congress from authorizing the creation of CFPB in Title X of Dodd-Frank. However, following Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the financial services industry and Republican legislators launched a new campaign to weaken CFPB’s autonomy and authority. The financial sector gave strong backing to Republican candidates in the 2010 congressional elections. That support helped Republicans to secure control of the House and capture several additional Senate seats.

Shortly after the new Congress convened in January 2011, Republican leaders in the House introduced legislation that would transform CFPB’s governance, powers and funding. The House Republican bills would (i) create a five-member bipartisan commission to govern CFPB in place of a single Director, (ii) grant federal banking agencies an expanded veto power over CFPB’s regulations, and (iii) give Congress complete control over CFPB’s budget. At the same time, 44 Republican Senators declared that they would block confirmation of any Director of CFPB until the President and Democratic leaders in Congress agreed to make the same three
changes to CFPB’s operations. Republicans again argued that CFPB would be a menacing superagency without meaningful oversight unless the stipulated changes were made. By preventing confirmation of any Director, Republicans have significantly limited CFPB’s ability to implement its mandate under Dodd-Frank.

Contrary to the claims advanced by CFPB’s opponents, Part III of this paper shows that CFPB’s governance, powers and funding are similar to those of other federal financial regulators. CFPB’s single-Director model of leadership is similar to the governance structure for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement powers are comparable to those exercised by OCC, FHFA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”). CFPB’s ability to fund its operations without relying on congressional appropriations is, again, comparable to the OCC, FHFA, FDIC and FRB. The financial services industry and its legislative allies have strenuously defended the governance structure, authority and independence of OCC and FHFA. Accordingly, it appears that CFPB’s opponents are motivated by their opposition to CFPB’s consumer protection mission rather than the bureau’s structure.

As explained in Part IV, the three changes in CFPB’s structure demanded by Republicans would significantly undermine CFPB’s autonomy and its ability to fulfill its statutory mandate. Replacing CFPB’s Director with a multicommission would increase the likelihood of infighting and deadlock within CFPB’s leadership. Allowing federal financial regulators to veto CFPB’s regulations by majority vote on general “safety and soundness” grounds would make it very difficult for CFPB to adopt rules that might reduce the short-term profitability of financial institutions. Requiring CFPB to depend on congressional appropriations for its budget would
greatly increase the risk that CFPB would be captured or neutralized by the financial services industry. Financial institutions and their trade associations have used the appropriations process to slash the budgets of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), thereby impairing the ability of those agencies to fulfill their statutory agendas prescribed by Dodd-Frank. In combination, the three changes advocated by Republicans would seriously impair CFPB’s ability to protect consumers. Contrary to the claims of the financial services industry, any weakening of CFPB would likely have deleterious effects not only on consumers, but also on the long-term soundness and stability of our financial system.

II. The Financial Services Industry and Its Congressional Allies Strongly Opposed CFPB’s Creation and Have Sought to Undermine Its Autonomy and Authority

A. The Industry’s Efforts to Prevent the Establishment of CFPB

During 2009 and 2010, financial industry trade groups – including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association – waged an aggressive campaign to defeat the Obama Administration’s proposal to establish an independent consumer financial protection agency. From the beginning of the debates over Dodd-Frank, industry associations and their

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members gave “top priority [to] killing President Obama’s proposal,” because they viewed CFPB as an “unneeded, intrusive new agency that would increase the[ir] cost of doing business.” The financial services industry urged Congress to leave the responsibility for protecting consumers of financial services with the federal banking agencies in order to ensure that any new consumer safeguards did not impair the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions.

Republican members of Congress supported the financial services industry by strongly objecting to the creation of any independent consumer financial protection agency and by insisting that the consumer protection function must “remain with federal banking regulators.” Republican leaders in the Senate bitterly opposed the proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) to establish an independent CFPB within the Fed. The disagreement over CFPB ultimately prevented any bipartisan agreement on Dodd-Frank’s terms.

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13 Kaiser, supra note 11.

14 Id.; see also R. Christian Bruce, “Regulatory Reform: Summers Urges Speed on Bank Reforms, Says Consumer Protection Agency Essential,” 93 BNA’s Banking Report 506 (Sept. 22, 2009) (“[T]he Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, and 23 other business groups said creating a stand-alone consumer protection agency with broad powers ‘is not the correct approach.’ [¶] Instead, ... existing regulatory agencies could be given beefed-up powers”).

15 Mike Ferullo, “Regulatory Reform: State Attorneys General Make Push For Consumer Financial Protection Agency,” 94 BNA’s Banking Report 309 (Feb. 16, 2010); see also id. (quoting argument by Senator Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican member of the Senate Banking Committee, that “consumer protection and safety and soundness regulation ... must be integrated with each other, not separated from each other”); Kaiser, supra note 11 (quoting Senator Shelby’s view that an independent agency would be “a folly and dangerous”).

16 See Cheyenne Hopkins, “Overseight by House GOP to Shape Rules,” American Banker, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1 (“Of all the parts in the [Dodd-Frank] bill, the GOP objected most strenuously to the creation of a consumer protection agency”); Stacy Kaper, “Dodd Recounts Battles Over Reg Reform,” American Banker, Aug. 24, 2010, at 1 (reporting that attempts by Senator Dodd to agree on a bipartisan bill with Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) “broke down” because of Republican “hostility” to CFPB’s creation); James Rowley & Lisa Lerer, “Consumer Agency Still ‘Elephant’ in Room for Finance Debate,”
After Republicans failed to block CFPB’s creation, they introduced an amendment on the Senate floor that would have significantly reduced CFPB’s powers and removed its independence. The Republican amendment would have placed the bureau firmly under FDIC’s control and would have barred the bureau from examining or regulating depository institutions. That amendment was supported by all but three Republican Senators, but it was defeated by the Democratic majority in the Senate.

During the final Senate debates on Dodd-Frank, Senator Shelby declared that CFPB would impose “massive new regulatory burdens on businesses, large and small” and would “stifle innovation in consumer financial products.” Other Republican members of Congress similarly alleged that CFPB would wield vast and unaccountable powers with devastating consequences for American businesses and consumers. Republican legislators warned that CFPB would be likely to adopt rules that could threaten the “safety and soundness” of financial

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17 Senator Shelby’s amendment (S. 3826) would have (i) designated CFPB as a division of FDIC, subject to FDIC’s oversight, (ii) required CFPB to obtain FDIC approval before issuing any rule, and (iii) exempted all depository institutions and most nonbank financial institutions from CFPB’s jurisdiction. See 156 Cong. Rec. S 3319-20 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Merkley); id. at S 3325-26 (remarks of Rep. Menendez).

18 Senator Shelby’s amendment failed by a vote of 38-61. All 59 Democratic Senators and two Republican Senators (Charles Grassley and Olympia Snowe) voted against the amendment, while another Republican (Senator Robert Bennett) did not vote. Id. at S 3327-28 (reporting the roll call vote on S. 3826).


20 See, e.g., id. at S 5884 (remarks of Sen. Kyl, asserting that CFPB “will have latitude to impose its will, with few checks and balances, on American credit providers, all of which will result in more expense, more regulation, higher costs for consumers, and less availability of credit”); id. at S 5816 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Bond, declaring that CFPB would be a “new superbureaucracy with unprecedented power” and its “decisions on credit will be driven by the administration’s political will and agenda”); id. at S 3321-22 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Enzi, claiming that CFPB would become “the single most powerful agency in the Federal Government” and would exercise “unchecked power . . . in the name of protecting us from ourselves,” thereby creating rules that would be “bad for small businesses and our communities, and . . . bad for individual consumer choices and freedoms”); see also Jacoby, supra note 11, at 100 n.6, 101 n.9 (quoting similar statements by Republican members of Congress who opposed CFPB’s creation).
institutions, notwithstanding any objections raised by federal banking agencies.\textsuperscript{21} Dodd-Frank passed by substantial margins in both houses of Congress, but only three Republican House members and three Republican Senators voted in favor of the legislation.\textsuperscript{22}

B. The Industry’s Post-Dodd-Frank Campaign to Weaken CFPB

As soon as Dodd-Frank was passed, the financial services industry and its Republican allies began a new campaign to reduce CFPB’s independence and authority. During the midterm elections of 2010, financial institutions and their trade groups gave a significant majority of their political contributions to Republican congressional candidates. The financial services industry’s strong backing for Republican candidates in 2010 represented a sharp reversal from the industry’s political behavior in 2006 and 2008, when the industry gave a majority of its financial support to Democratic candidates. The financial industry’s shift in contributions reflected the industry’s anger and frustration over Dodd-Frank’s passage and CFPB’s creation.\textsuperscript{23}

The Republicans secured control of the House and captured several additional seats in the Senate. Following the 2010 elections, Republican congressional leaders announced plans to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Mike Ferrulo, “Regulatory Reform: House Clears Financial Reform Bill Along Party Lines, Senate Action Delayed,” \textit{95 BNA’s Banking Report} 5 (July 6, 2010) (reporting that Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 237-192 in the House, and noting that “[t]hree Republicans voted for the bill and 19 Democrats voted against it”); Mike Ferrulo et al., “Regulatory Reform: Senate Sends Financial Regulatory To White House for President’s Signature,” \textit{95 BNA’s Banking Report} 90 (July 20, 2010) (reporting that Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 60-39 in the Senate, and noting that Republican Senators Scott Brown, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe voted in favor of Dodd-Frank while Senator Russ Feingold “was the sole Democrat in opposition”).
\end{itemize}
introduce legislation that would change CFPB’s structure and weaken its independence. During the spring of 2011, Republican leaders in the House introduced bills that would (i) establish a multimember board to govern CFPB, (ii) give federal prudential regulators a stronger potential veto over CFPB’s rulemaking, and (iii) enable Congress to control CFPB’s budget through the appropriations process. Financial industry trade groups and major banks strongly supported Republican efforts to reduce CFPB’s autonomy and authority, and they urged House members to pass the Republican bills.

On July 21, 2011 (the first anniversary of Dodd-Frank’s enactment), the House of Representatives passed legislation that would (i) create a five-member commission to oversee CFPB, (ii) suspend all of CFPB’s powers until the Senate confirmed a Director of CFPB, and (iii) expand the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to veto CFPB’s regulations. Under the House bill, a majority of FSOC’s members could vote to override any CFPB regulation that they found to be inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of U.S.

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financial institutions, and CFPB would be barred from participating in any override vote by FSOC.\textsuperscript{27} In contrast, as discussed below, Dodd-Frank permits FSOC to veto a CFPB regulation only if two-thirds of FSOC’s members (including CFPB) determine that the challenged regulation would threaten the safety and soundness of the entire U.S. banking system or the stability of the entire U.S. financial system.\textsuperscript{28} Republicans also sponsored a separate House bill that would make all of CFPB’s funding subject to congressional appropriations by 2013.\textsuperscript{29}

Republicans in the Senate actively supported the efforts of their House colleagues. On May 5, 2011, Senator Richard Shelby and 43 other Republican Senators declared that they would block Senate confirmation of any CFPB Director until Congress passed legislation that incorporated the three principal changes included in the House bills.\textsuperscript{30} Senator Shelby and his Republican colleagues demanded that Congress establish a multimember board to govern CFPB, give federal banking agencies a “safety-and-soundness check” over CFPB’s rules, and ensure congressional control over CFPB’s budget.\textsuperscript{31} The American Bankers Association applauded the


\textsuperscript{28} See infra note 112 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{30} Mike Ferrulo, “Consumer Protection: Republican Senators Vow to Block Nominee For CFPB Without Changes to New Agency,” \textit{96 BNA’s Banking Report} 849 (May 10, 2011) (describing letter sent by Republican Senators to President Obama); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 11 (reporting that “[t]he structural changes proposed by the senators in their letter echo proposals advancing in the Republican-controlled House”).

Republican Senators for insisting on those changes as a precondition for confirming any Director of CFPB.32

During the Senate Banking Committee hearing on July 19, 2011, Senator Shelby again maintained that the CFPB was a “huge new and entirely unaccountable bureaucracy” that lacked any “meaningful congressional oversight.”33 Senator Shelby repeated the Republican demands for fundamental changes in CFPB’s governance, funding and authority. Witnesses for the American Banks Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly supported Senator Shelby’s position at the hearing.34 The financial services industry also continued its pattern of giving the great majority of its contributions to Republican leaders in 2011, thereby rewarding Republicans for their vigorous opposition to Dodd-Frank and CFPB.35


33 Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 11 (quoting statement by Frank Keating, head of the American Bankers Ass’n).


35 Fabian, supra note 33.

36 Jonathan D. Salant & Lisa Lerer, “Romney Lures Obama Wall Street Donors,” Bloomberg.com, Sept. 27, 2011 (“Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney has raised more than twice as much money from Wall Street as Barack Obama”); Wack, supra note 23 (“In 2008, Barack Obama was the toast of Wall Street,” but “so far in the 2012 race, the six largest U.S. banks have switched sides in a dramatic way, and are giving far more money to GOP hopeful Mitt Romney than they are to the sitting president. . . . While Obama has touted Dodd-Frank as an achievement of his first term, Romney has criticized the law”); Kevin Wack, “GOP Fundraising Beats Dems’,” American Banker, Aug. 31, 2011, at 3 (reporting that Rep. Spencer Bachus and Sen. Richard Shelby, the Republican leaders on the House and Senate banking committees, had received much larger amounts of campaign contributions in 2011 than their Democratic counterparts, Rep. Barney Frank and Sen. Tim Johnson, and a larger percentage of the Republicans’ contributions came from the financial services industry); William Selway & Martin Z. Baum, “Derivatives: Bachus Is Wall Street’s Man in Jefferson County,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, May 31 –
Meanwhile, a contemporaneous poll commissioned by Consumer Reports reported that 74% of respondents favored the creation of CFPB as an independent agency with the sole mission of protecting consumers of financial services. The poll showed that large majorities of Democrats, independents and Republicans supported CFPB and its mission. More than four-fifths of the poll respondents agreed that CFPB’s “top priorities” should include “strengthening and enforcing rules against deceptive and unfair practices” by financial institutions and “requiring that mortgage and other documents be easier for consumers to understand.”

Nearly three-quarters of the poll’s respondents also supported Dodd-Frank as a whole, including a majority of Republican respondents. Given the strong public backing for CFPB and Dodd-Frank, as well as widespread popular hostility toward large financial institutions, Republican leaders evidently concluded that their most prudent course of action would be to push for legislation imposing tight restrictions on CFPB instead of seeking to eliminate the bureau. Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) alleged that the Republican-backed House
legislation “is as close as [Republicans] dare come now, because of public opinion, to abolishing the whole agency. . . . They do understand that politically it’s not a good idea to be fully straightforward about their intentions, and they’d really like to repeal it.”

In October 2011, the Senate Banking Committee approved President Obama’s nomination of Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s first Director by a party-line vote of 12-10, with all Republican committee members voting against the nomination. Two months later, 45 Republican Senators (more than enough to sustain a filibuster) voted to block the Senate’s confirmation of Mr. Cordray. Senate Republican leaders reaffirmed their intention to prevent confirmation of any nominee for Director until Congress passed legislation to satisfy their demands for changes in CFPB’s governance, authority and funding.

By preventing Senate confirmation of any Director, Republicans and the financial services industry have greatly reduced CFPB’s ability to exercise the powers that Dodd-Frank conferred on CFPB on July 21, 2011. According to a joint legal opinion prepared by the Inspectors General (“IGs”) of the Treasury Department and the Fed, CFPB may take the following actions without a Senate-confirmed Director: (i) issuing rules, orders and guidance

Americans who trust US banks has dropped to a low of 25 per cent, down from 33 per cent a year ago and 71 per cent before the financial crisis”); Richard Burnett, “Consumers unhappy with banks,” Orlando Sentinel (FL), Dec. 23, 2010, at B5; “Americans’ anger not easing over banks’ practices,” Charleston Gazette (WV), Dec. 10, 2010, at P3D.

40 Davidson & Adler, supra note 27 (quoting Rep. Frank). Similarly, Senate Banking Committee chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) criticized Republican Senators for their “misleading claim of no CFPB accountability” and declared that Republicans were trying to “destroy the Bureau’s ability to do its job of protecting American consumers.” Kate Davidson, “Cordray Hearing Devolves into Partisan Fight Over CFPB Structure,” American Banker, Sept. 7, 2011.


under existing federal consumer financial laws that were enforced by other federal agencies prior to the transfer of their functions to CFPB on July 21, 2011, (ii) enforcing previous orders, agreements and other rulings issued by those agencies under such laws; and (iii) examining depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion. However, the Fed and Treasury IGs concluded that CFPB must have a Senate-confirmed Director in order to exercise its other powers under Dodd-Frank, including (1) prescribing rules under new statutory authorities not transferred from other federal agencies, (2) issuing rules and orders prohibiting unfair, deceptive and abusive acts and practices, and (3) supervising nondepository providers of consumer financial services.

Thus, according to the joint opinion of the Fed and Treasury IGs, “[u]ntil the Senate confirms a director, the CFPB cannot oversee non-bank lenders or assume enhanced consumer protection powers mandated under [Dodd-Frank].” Assuming the correctness of that opinion, CFPB currently lacks authority to establish the type of consumer financial protection regime envisioned by Dodd-Frank – namely, a regime that ensures a “level playing field for all banks and . . . nondepository financial companies” and that “ha[s] enough flexibility to address future

43 In reaching this conclusion, the Inspectors General relied on Section 1066(a) of Dodd-Frank. Section 1066(a) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to perform the functions prescribed under Sections 1061-67 of Dodd-Frank (dealing with the transfer of consumer financial protection functions from other agencies) “until the Director of [CFPB] is confirmed by the Senate.” Dodd-Frank § 1066(a). See Letter dated Jan. 10, 2011, to Rep. Spencer Bachus and Rep. Judy Biggert from Eric M. Thorson and Elizabeth A. Coleman, forwarding “Joint Response by the Inspectors General of the Department of the Treasury and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Request for Information Regarding the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,” at 4-6, available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/OIG-CA%202011004%20Committee%20of%20Financial%20Services%20Response%20CFPB.pdf.

44 Id. at 6-7. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s authority to supervise and examine nondepository providers of consumer financial services).

45 Mike Ferrulo, “Consumer Protection: House Approves Legislation to Alter CFPB As Agency Gets Underway; Obama Vows Veto,” 97 BNA’s Banking Report 163 (July 26, 2011); see also Kate Davidson, “Leaderless CFPB Not a Blessing for Bankers,” American Banker, July 12, 2011 (describing limitations on CFPB’s authority without a Director).
problems as they arise.” Although CFPB’s current inability to regulate nonbanks would appear to disadvantage banks, the banking industry seems willing to accept an uneven playing field as long as it includes a referee (i.e., CFPB) with sharply limited powers. For example, Andrew Kahr, a prominent financial executive (and founder of Providian, the highly controversial credit card bank), argued in July 2011 that banks should prefer a leaderless CFPB, notwithstanding any concerns about the lack of a “level playing field” with nonbanks:

For at least 200 years, banks have benefited from a playing field tilted sharply in our favor. Only banks can take deposits. Banks can preempt many state restrictions, including usury limits . . . .

That’s why nonbanks want to own banks: because banks have the advantage. . . .

. . . .

Even with the CFPB now pursuing only banks, using existing regulatory powers, we will still retain most of our advantages over nonbanks.

However, once a director is confirmed banks will suffer severely. The CFPB will then have the power, under Dodd-Frank, to prohibit “unfair” practices by banks. (Until the CFPB has a director, no regulator has that power.)

. . . .

Well let’s say the Republicans control both houses of Congress after the 2012 election. We might then hope for some rollback of CFPB authority. Even if

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46 Senate Report No. 111-176, at 11 (2010); see also Davidson, supra note 45 (quoting Amy Friend, former Senate Banking Committee chief counsel, who explained that “[t]he objective in creating [CFPB] was to have an agency that would focus more on consumer protection than the banking agencies had, and would be able to fully scrutinize larger nonbanks in particular”).

47 See Davidson, supra note 45 (stating that “some bankers are secretly gleeful the [CFPB] does not yet have a director”)
there’s only one chance in four of that, banks should prefer to avoid promulgation of very costly regulations and enforcement actions based on the CFPB’s new powers until that election.\textsuperscript{48}

Mr. Kahr added, perhaps in jest, “Let the bad times roll!”\textsuperscript{49} In explaining why banks should oppose a Senate-confirmed CFPB Director, Mr. Kahr warned that a CFPB Director would have authority to condemn “unfair” consumer financial products, which could potentially include $39 bank overdraft fees and high-cost “credit protection products” offered by banks.\textsuperscript{50} Mr. Kahr

\textsuperscript{48} Andrew Kahr, “Let’s Keep the CFPB Leaderless,” \textit{American Banker}, July 26, 2011, at 6. According to one of his previous op-eds, Mr. Kahr “is a principal in Credit Builders LLC, a financial product development company, and was the founding chief executive officer of Providian Financial Corp.”

Andrew Kahr, “It’s Official: ‘Prepaid’ Cards Face Cap,” \textit{American Banker}, July 6, 2011, at 8. Mr. Kahr was CEO of Providian from the early 1980s to 1988, and he subsequently served as a consultant to Providian from 1988 to 2000. According to one news account, he was “the genius behind Providian’s success” in marketing high-cost credit cards to high-risk borrowers during the 1990s.


In 2000, Providian paid $300 million to settle enforcement actions brought by state and federal officials alleging deceptive and predatory lending practices. “Mr. Kahr was not charged with wrongdoing,” but his “consulting contract was ended in 2000” Zuckerman, supra; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,” 23 \textit{Annual Review of Banking & Financial Law} 225, 315-16 (2004) (referring to enforcement actions against Providian); see also Duncan A. MacDonald, “Comptroller Has Duty to Clean Up Card Pricing Mess,” \textit{American Banker}, Nov. 21, 2003, at 17 (letter from former general counsel of Citigroup’s European and North American credit card businesses, alleging that Providian’s “telemarketing and pricing practices . . . bordered on the criminal. For a decade Providian had been well known in the [credit] card industry as the poster child of abusive consumer practices”).

\textsuperscript{49} Kahr, supra note 48. In a 1999 memo to a Providian executive, Mr. Kahr observed, “Making people pay for access to credit is a lucrative business wherever it is practiced. . . . The trick is charging a lot, repeatedly, for small doses of incremental credit.” Zuckerman, supra note 48 (quoting March 1999 memo from Mr. Kahr to Providian Executive Vice President David Alvarez). In a 1998 memo to Providian executives, Mr. Kahr recommended that Providian should not disclose that some of its credit cards lacked any “grace period” before customer payments were due. Instead of a “no grace period” disclosure, Mr. Kahr suggested that Providian should use “one of the numerous ideas for a ‘limited’ grace period that have been put forward. ‘Limited’ meaning that the customer responds to (it) as if there were a grace period, but in reality almost no one gets the benefit of it.” \textit{Id}. (quoting July 1998 memo from Mr. Kahr to Mr. Alvarez and Dawn Greiner, Providian’s head of new product development).

\textsuperscript{50} Id.; see also infra notes 56, 106 (discussing CFPB’s authority to prohibit “unfair” acts or practices). Mr. Kahr’s concern that CFPB might act to regulate overdraft fees was not misplaced. In September 2011, Raj Date, assistant to the Treasury Secretary for administering CFPB, indicated that the bureau would take a
observed that bank regulators have permitted profit margins for bank credit protection products that are much higher than the profit margins permitted by state insurance regulators for similar products sold by insurance companies. In Mr. Kahr’s view, that differential provided “yet another example of a very unlevel playing field, enormously favorable to banks versus nonbanks.”51 Accordingly, he asked, “Is this the time to activate additional elements of [CFPB] regulation that can only render banks less profitable – and perhaps more inclined to take greater risks in order to achieve adequate return?”52

III. CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding Are Similar to Those of Other Financial Regulators

CFPB’s powers, governance and funding are hardly unprecedented among federal financial regulators. CFPB’s rulemaking and enforcement authorities resemble those of other federal bank regulators. CFPB’s leadership by a single Director is similar to OCC and FHFA. CFPB’s ability to fund its operations without relying on congressional appropriations is comparable to other financial regulators except for CFTC and SEC. While the financial services industry and its Republican allies have vigorously attacked CFPB’s perceived independence, they have strongly defended the autonomy enjoyed by OCC and FHFA, which represent the closest regulatory analogues to CFPB. Thus, it appears that the financial industry and its


52 Kahr, supra note 48.
legislative supporters are primarily opposed to CFPB’s expected policy choices, not its structural characteristics.

A. CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding

Title X of Dodd–Frank, designated as the “Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010” (“CFP Act”), establishes CFPB as an “independent bureau” in the Fed to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”

CFPB’s statutory mission is “to implement and . . . enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services . . . [that] are fair, transparent, and competitive.” The “Federal consumer financial law” that falls within CFPB’s jurisdiction includes eighteen previously enacted federal statutes as well as the “new consumer financial protection mandates prescribed by the [CFP] Act.”

CFPB may issue regulations to implement federal consumer financial laws and may also issue rules or orders to prohibit “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) in consumer financial services. CFPB may also issue regulations to ensure that “the features of any consumer financial product or service . . . are fully, accurately, and, effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the product or service.”

54 Dodd–Frank § 1021(a)
55 Mierzweski et al., supra note 53, at 724–25; see also Dodd-Frank § 1002(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law” to include Title X of Dodd–Frank, eighteen federal consumer protection statutes that are enumerated in Dodd-Frank § 1002(12), and certain other laws).
56 Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b), 1031(b).
57 Id. § 1032(a).
Title X empowers CFPB to supervise and examine depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion (and their affiliates) as well as all nondepository providers of consumer financial services. CFPB may pursue a variety of enforcement powers to prevent violations of Title X and CFPB’s regulations thereunder, or any of the eighteen federal consumer financial statutes enumerated in Section 1002(12) of Dodd-Frank. CFPB’s enforcement authorities include (i) undertaking investigations and performing administrative discovery, (ii) initiating administrative enforcement proceedings, (iii) filing judicial enforcement actions, and (iv) referring criminal charges to the Department of Justice.

CFPB may use administrative or judicial proceedings to obtain a wide range of legal and equitable remedies, including refunds, restitution, damages, cease-and-desist orders, civil money penalties and injunctive relief. CFPB’s administrative and judicial enforcement powers are generally similar to those granted to federal banking agencies and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). Like the FTC, CFPB is statutorily barred from imposing punitive damages.

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58 Depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less will be examined by federal banking agencies to assess their compliance with consumer financial protection laws. Mierzewski et al., supra note 53, at 731-32. CFPB has authority (i) to obtain reports from smaller depository institutions, (ii) to include one of CFPB’s examiners on the examination teams for such depository institutions, and (iii) to provide input to the primary regulations of such institutions with regard to the scope and conduct of examinations, the contents of examination reports and examination ratings. Dodd-Frank, § 1026.

59 Dodd-Frank, §§ 1002(12), 1031, 1036(a)(1)(B), 1052-1055. CFPB may not bring an administrative enforcement hearing to enforce an enumerated federal consumer financial law to the extent that the law in question specifically limits CFPB’s authority to do so. Id. § 1053(a)(2).

60 Id. §§ 1052-56; see Mierzewski et al., supra note 53, at 732–35 (describing CFPB’s enforcement powers). CFPB has authority to represent itself in the Supreme Court if it submits a request to the Attorney General and the Attorney General concurs or acquiesces in that request. Dodd-Frank § 1054(e).

61 Id. §§ 1053-1055.

62 See infra notes 98-99 (discussing enforcement powers of federal banking agencies); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b, 57b-1 (prescribing the FTC’s enforcement authorities).

63 12 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (prohibiting FTC from assessing punitive damages); Dodd-Frank, § 1055(a)(3) (imposing same prohibition on CFPB).
Thus, Title X vests CFPB with broadly-defined powers to regulate providers of consumer financial products and services. However, CFPB may not regulate the ability of persons to carry on the businesses of insurance, securities, commodity trading or managing employee benefit or compensation plans. In addition, sellers of nonfinancial goods and manufactured homes, real estate brokers, auto dealers, attorneys, accountants and tax preparers are not subject to CFPB’s jurisdiction unless they engage in offering covered financial products or services.

Title X provides that CFPB will be administered by a single Director. The President appoints CFPB’s Director for a five-year term, with the Senate’s advice and consent, and may remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The Director may issue rules, orders and guidance “to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.” The Director also hires and manages CFPB’s employees.

Title X protects CFPB’s autonomy in several ways. Title X prohibits the FRB from taking any of the following actions: (i) intervening in any CFPB examination, enforcement action or other proceeding; (ii) appointing, directing or removing any CFPB officer or employee; (iii) combining CFPB or any of its functions with any other FRB unit, (iv) reviewing, approving or delaying any CFPB rule or order; or (v) reviewing or approving any legislative

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64 See id. §§ 1002(5), (6), (26) (defining “consumer financial product or service,” “covered person,” and “service provider”); Mierzewski et al., supra note 53, at 726 (describing persons, products and services that are regulated under Title X).
65 Dodd-Frank § 1027(f)-(i), (m).
67 Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(1).
68 Id. § 1011(c). The Supreme Court has observed, in the context of a similar removal statute, that the quoted terms “are very broad and . . . could sustain removal of a [federal official] for any number of actual or perceived transgressions . . . . “ Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986).
69 Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(1).
70 Id. §1013(a).
recommendations, testimony or comments of CFPB’s Director. Thus, Title X “makes clear that [CFPB] is to function without any interference by [FRB].”

In addition, Title X requires FRB to provide CFPB with annual funding up to a maximum limit of approximately $500 million (to be adjusted for future inflation). CFPB’s guaranteed funding from FRB is not subject to congressional appropriations. However, if CFPB determines that its guaranteed funding from the FRB is inadequate to carry out its responsibilities, CFPB must seek additional funds from Congress through the appropriations process.

B. Comparing the Powers, Governance and Funding of CFPB and Other Financial Regulators

The powers of CFPB are comparable to those of other federal financial regulators. As explained in the Senate report, Dodd-Frank’s provisions for CFPB were “modeled on similar statutes governing the [OCC] and the Office of Thrift Supervision [―OTS‖], which are located within the Department of Treasury.” Dodd-Frank abolished OTS, but OCC continues to function as an autonomous bureau of the Treasury pursuant to the National Bank Act (“NBA”).

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71 Id. § 1012(c).
73 FRB must provide annual funding to CFPB in an “amount determined by [CFPB’s] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out [CFPB’s] authorities” in view of other funding available to the CFPB, up to the following maximum limits: (i) 10% of the Fed’s 2009 operating expenses in fiscal year 2011, (ii) 11% of such expenses in fiscal year 2012, and (iii) 12% of such expenses in each subsequent fiscal year, with appropriate increases to reflect future inflation. Dodd–Frank § 1017(a). Dodd–Frank will require the Fed to provide approximately $500 million of funding to CFPB in fiscal year 2013 and subsequent years. See Senate Report No. 111-176, at 164 (graph) (2010).
74 Id. § 1017(2)(C).
75 Id. § 1017(e).
77 Dodd-Frank § 313. Dodd-Frank transfers the functions of OTS to FDIC, FRB and OCC. Id. § 312.
Under the NBA, OCC is administered by a single official, the Comptroller of the Currency (“Comptroller”).\textsuperscript{79} Like CFPB’s Director, the Comptroller is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a five-year term.\textsuperscript{80} The Comptroller’s autonomy is similar to that of the CFPB Director. The Treasury cannot prevent or delay the issuance of any OCC regulation, and the Treasury may not intervene in any matter before the Comptroller (including an agency enforcement action) unless specifically authorized by law.\textsuperscript{81}

FHFA is responsible for regulating Fannie Mae (“Fannie”), Freddie Mac (“Freddie”) and the Federal Home Loan Banks (“FHLBs”).\textsuperscript{82} Like CFPB’s Director and the Comptroller, FHFA’s Director serves as the single head of the agency.\textsuperscript{83} FHFA’s Director’s mode of appointment and term of office are similar to CFPB’s Director and the Comptroller. The President appoints FHFA’s Director for a five-year term, with the Senate’s advice and consent, and the President may remove FHFA’s Director “for cause.”\textsuperscript{84} In contrast to the single-agency-
head model of CFPB, OCC and FHA, the FDIC and FRB are administered by multi-member boards.85

All five of the foregoing financial regulators have substantial budgetary autonomy. OCC, FDIC and FHFA fund their operations by collecting fees and assessments from the institutions they regulate.86 FRB finances its operations from the earnings generated by its large portfolio of government securities and other investments.87 Thus, each of those four agencies is completely independent of congressional appropriations. In contrast, CFPB’s has partial budgetary autonomy. As explained above, the independent funding that CFPB receives from FRB is capped at approximately $500 million, adjusted for future inflation, and CFPB is required to seek a congressional appropriation if it wishes to increase its budget beyond that amount.88

In some areas, CFPB’s regulatory powers are less extensive than those of FHFA and federal bank regulators. For example, FHFA may serve as conservator or receiver of any of its regulated entities.89 FHFA has served as conservator for Fannie and Freddie since September 2008.90 FDIC has similar authority to act as conservator or receiver for any FDIC-insured national or state bank,91 or as receiver for any financial company whose failure “would have

85 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 61-63. Two other federal financial regulators – CFTC and SEC – are similarly administered by multimember commissions. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation § 1.3[1], at 27, § 22.7[1], at 752 n.28 (6th ed. 2009).
87 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 62.
88 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s funding).
90 The FHFA was appointed as conservator of Fannie and Freddie on September 6, 2008, and it has continued to administer those conservatorships since that time. FHFA 2010 Annual Report, supra note 86, at 1-6.
91 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 700-01; 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c).
serious effects on financial stability in the United States.” CFPB does not have authority to act as conservator or receiver for any provider of consumer financial services.

OCC exercises extensive supervisory powers over the structure and governance of national banks, including the authority to approve or deny applications for new charters, changes in the location of main offices and branches, opening of new branches, conversions into state banks, and mergers and consolidations with other depository institutions. CFPB does not possess comparable supervisory powers over providers of consumer financial services. Unlike CFPB, OCC is a “safety and soundness” regulator, and OCC therefore has prudential authority to regulate national banks with regard to such matters as capital adequacy, asset quality, competence and integrity of management, and adequacy of liquidity. FDIC and FRB have similar powers to regulate the safety and soundness of state banks and bank holding companies. Likewise, FHFA has broad authority to supervise the capital, assets and liabilities of Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs for the purpose of promoting their safety and soundness.

In other respects, CFPB’s powers are similar to those of other financial regulators. CFPB, OCC, FDIC, FHFA and FRB all have authority to examine financial service providers subject to their respective jurisdictions in order to ensure compliance with applicable laws and

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93 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 27, 30, 36, 214, 214a, 215, 215a, 215a-1, 1828(c),1831u; see also Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 73-76, 86-89,191-95 (discussing “safety and soundness” regulation of banks).
94 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 61-62, 251-53, 279-93, 627-35; Levitin, supra note 9, at 155-58.
95 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 62-63. 251- 53, 279-93, 455-59, 627-35.
96 12 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4618, 4622-4624; see, e.g., id. § 4611(a)(1) (mandating that FHFA’s Director must “establish risk-based capital requirements for [Fannie and Freddie] to ensure that [Fannie and Freddie] operate in a safe and sound manner”); id. § 4624(a) (requiring that FHFA’s Director “establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of [Fannie and Freddie], to ensure that the holdings are backed by sufficient capital and consistent with the mission and the safe and sound operations of [Fannie and Freddie]”).
All five regulators also have comprehensive enforcement powers, including the authority to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders and civil money penalty orders. However, unlike the other four agencies, CFPB does not have authority to remove or suspend officers and directors of the companies it regulates.

C. Significant Statutory Limits on CFPB’s Powers

As noted above, CFPB has broadly-defined powers to regulate providers of consumer financial services. However, Title X of Dodd-Frank imposes several significant limitations on the exercise of those powers. CFPB may not impose any usury limit on consumer credit transactions “unless explicitly authorized by law.” Moreover, before it issues any regulation, CFPB must consider “the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered [providers of consumer financial services], including the potential reduction of access of consumers to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule.” In particular, CFPB must assess the impact of any proposed rule on consumers in rural areas and depository institutions.

97 For examination powers granted to OCC, FRB, FDIC and FHFA, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 481, 483, 1820, 1844(c), 4517. For the CFPB Director’s powers to conduct examinations of nondepository providers of consumer financial services and large depository institutions with more than $10 billion in assets, see Dodd-Frank §§ 1024(b), 1025(a).
98 For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders and civil money penalty orders, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (c), (i). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. §§, 4581, 4585, 4631, 4632, 4636. For CFPB’s authority to issue such orders, see Dodd-Frank §§ 1053, 1055. Unlike the FHFA, FRB and OCC, the FDIC and CFPB may also file court actions to obtain civil remedies against persons subject to their regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(Fourth) (FDIC’s authority to file court suits); Dodd-Frank § 1054 (CFPB’s litigation authority). All five agencies may file judicial actions to enforce their administrative orders. See Dodd-Frank § 1053(d) (CFPB’s power to seek judicial enforcement of administrative orders); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (similar authority granted to FDIC, FRB and OCC); id. § 4635 (similar authority granted to FHFA).
99 For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue orders removing or suspending officers and directors of regulated institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e), (g). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. § 4636a.
100 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
101 Dodd-Frank §1027(n).
102 Id. § 1022(b)(2)(i).
with assets of less than $10 billion. CFPB must also analyze (i) any expected increase in the cost of credit for small businesses that would result from the proposed rule, (ii) any alternatives that would accomplish CFPB’s statutory objectives and minimize any such increase in cost, and (iii) the advice and recommendations that CFPB’s small business advisory panel submitted with regard to the proposed rule.

Thus, CFPB must take due account of the likely costs and benefits of each new rule, and it must assess the impact of each rule on consumers, providers of consumer financial services and small businesses. Title X’s requirement of a cost-benefit analysis for each new regulation makes CFPB’s rulemakings more vulnerable to judicial challenges and therefore encourages CFPB to adopt incremental rather than far-reaching rules.

Title X also imposes tight restrictions on CFPB’s UDAAP authority. CFPB may not issue a rule or order declaring an act or practice to be “unfair” unless the agency has a “reasonable basis to conclude” that (1) the act or practice is likely to cause a “substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers” and (2) that injury is “not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” Similarly, CFPB may not issue a rule or order declaring an act or practice to be “abusive” unless the act or practice either (a) “materially interferes” with a consumer’s ability to understand a financial product or service, or (b) “takes unreasonable advantage” of (i) a consumer’s lack of understanding of “the material risks, costs, or conditions” of the product or service, or (ii) the consumer’s inability to protect his

103 Id. § 1022(b)(2)(ii).
104 Dodd-Frank § 1100G.
105 See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down SEC’s proxy access rule (Rule 14a-11) because SEC failed to comply with its statutory obligation to perform an adequate analysis of the potential costs and benefits of the rule, including the rule’s impact on “efficiency, competition and capital formation”).
106 Id. § 1031(c).
or her interests in selecting or using that product or service, or (iii) the consumer’s reasonable reliance on the provider of that product or service.\textsuperscript{107}

Title X allows other federal financial regulators to exert significant influence over CFPB’s regulations. CFPB may not adopt any rule (including any UDAAP rule) unless it has previously consulted with federal banking regulators and other appropriate federal agencies about the “consistency” of the proposed rule with “prudential, market, or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”\textsuperscript{108} If any prudential regulator objects in writing to a proposed CFPB regulation, CFPB must include in its final rulemaking a description of the regulator’s objection and CFPB’s response to that objection.\textsuperscript{109} In addition, any federal agency that is a member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may petition the FSOC to veto any regulation issued by CFPB.\textsuperscript{110} After such a petition is filed, FSOC’s chairman (the Treasury Secretary) may stay the effectiveness of the challenged CFPB regulation for up to 90 days to allow “appropriate consideration of the petition by [FSOC].”\textsuperscript{111}

FSOC may set aside the challenged CFPB regulation, or any provision thereof, if two-thirds of FSOC’s members determine that “the regulation or provision would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk.”\textsuperscript{112} CFPB is the only federal financial regulator whose regulations are

\textsuperscript{107} Id. § 1031(d).
\textsuperscript{108} Id. §§ 1022(b)(2)(B), 1031(e).
\textsuperscript{109} Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C).
\textsuperscript{110} Id. § 1023. FSOC has ten voting members, including the heads of nine federal financial agencies – the Treasury Department, CFPB, CFTC, FDIC, FHFA, FRB, National Credit Union Administration, OCC and SEC – and an independent member with insurance experience. FSOC also includes five non-voting members – the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, the Office of Financial Research, and three state officials responsible for regulating banks, insurance companies and securities firms. Id. § 111(b).
\textsuperscript{111} Id. § 1023(c)(1).
\textsuperscript{112} Id. § 1023(a). (c)(3). Only an “agency represented by a member of [FSOC]” may file a petition to stay or set aside a CFPB regulation. Id. § 1023(b)(1). It is not entirely clear from the text of section 1023 whether members of FSOC that are considered nonvoting members under section 111 are nevertheless entitled to vote on petitions to set aside CFPB regulations under section 1023.
subject to override by an appellate body composed of heads of other agencies. As noted above, Title X requires CFPB to consult with federal prudential regulators before issuing any regulation, and CFPB would therefore have a strong incentive not to “risk a[n] FSOC rebuke” by adopting a regulation that had provoked a strong objection from another federal regulator during the consultative process.

Title X also subjects CFPB to significant oversight by the executive and legislative branches. CFPB must submit semi-annual reports to the President and Congress, and CFPB’s Director must testify about those reports at semi-annual hearings before the responsible congressional committees. In addition, CFPB’s financial operations are “subject to an annual audit by the Government Accountability Office [(GAO)], with the results reported to Congress.” None of the other federal bank regulators is subject to an annual audit by GAO.

Thus, while CFPB’s powers are undeniably broad, the agency is constrained by significant statutory limitations, “includ[ing] some unique requirements that other banking regulators do not face.”

D. CFPB’s Opponents Are Motivated by the Bureau’s Consumer Protection Mission, Not Its Structure

113 Written Testimony of Adam J. Levitin Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, July 19, 2011, at 8 [hereinafter Levitin Testimony], available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1980c90b-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a&Witness_ID=74b14ea1-b0e7-40f5-8d1c-5de7aea00e5a.
114 Id.
115 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116 Levitin Testimony, supra note 113, at 8.
117 Dodd-Frank § 1016.
118 Levitin Testimony, supra note 113, at 8 (citing Dodd-Frank. § 1017(a)(5)).
120 Davidson, supra note 119.
As shown above, CFPB’s powers, governance and funding are comparable to those of two other federal financial regulators – OCC and FHFA.\(^{121}\) Yet the financial services industry and its legislative allies have strongly championed the single leadership governance model and funding arrangements for OCC and FHFA while condemning CFPB’s similar features. The marked contrast between the financial industry’s attacks on CFPB and its support for OCC and FHFA reveal that the industry’s true reason for opposing CFPB is its consumer protection mandate, not its structure.

OCC is widely viewed as the most committed regulatory champion for the interests of major banks.\(^{122}\) All of the largest banks operate under national charters, and assessments paid by national banks fund virtually all of the OCC’s budget. Understandably, given its strong budgetary incentives, OCC has competed strenuously with FRB, FDIC and state regulators to attract and retain the allegiance of large banks.\(^{123}\) During the past three decades, OCC aggressively preempted state consumer protection laws and adopted “light touch” regulatory policies that helped national banks to build leading positions in consumer lending markets for residential mortgages and credit cards.\(^{124}\) OCC also issued dozens of rulings that greatly

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\(^{121}\) See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text (discussing similarities among CFPB, OCC and FHFA).


\(^{123}\) Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 157-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at 91-95; Levitin, supra note 9, at 152-58; Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 259-65, 274-79, 296-97.

\(^{124}\) See authorities cited supra in note 123; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 164-73; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 910-19; Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 348-56.
expanded the permissible activities of national banks in areas such as data processing, derivatives, equipment leasing, insurance sales, real estate investments and securities activities.

During the deliberations over Dodd-Frank and other regulatory responses to the financial crisis, OCC strongly opposed a wide variety reforms, including reforms that would (i) allow the states to give greater protections to consumers who buy products and services from national banks, (ii) provide improved safeguards for credit card customers, (iii) require national banks to retain a substantial portion of the risk of loans they sell for securitization, and (iv) impose tighter restrictions on compensation for bank executives. In each case, OCC adopted an anti-reform position that was strongly aligned with major banks and their trade associations.

Following the enactment of Dodd-Frank, OCC continued to support anti-reform sentiments expressed by major banks. For example, Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh called for “modest” increases in capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”), while other federal regulators advocated significantly higher capital surcharges for SIFIs. Mr. Walsh also questioned the desirability of other reforms mandated by

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127 Donna Borak, “OCC’s Walsh Signals U.S. Split Over SIFI Charge,” American Banker, June 21, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Walsh and OCC favored a “modest” capital surcharge for SIFIs, while other regulators, including FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, supported a much higher capital surcharge for SIFIs).
Dodd-Frank, including the “Volcker rule” that restricts bank trading activities.128 In a speech delivered on June 21, 2011, Mr. Walsh warned that “in the frenzy of the moment, we can overreact in response to crisis. . . . [W]e are in danger of trying to squeeze too much risk and complexity out of banking.”129 One news report observed that Mr. Walsh “voiced the frustration of many bankers” about Dodd-Frank.130

Mr. Walsh and OCC created additional controversy by issuing regulations that preserved most of the sweeping preemption rules that OCC had issued in 2004.131 National banks and their trade associations warmly endorsed the OCC’s revised preemption regulations.132 However, the OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking for those regulations provoked an unusual public rebuke from Treasury Department General Counsel George Madison. Mr. Madison criticized OCC’s

130 Appelbaum, supra note 128.

Republican members of Congress expressed great concern that the Treasury Department’s public criticism of the OCC’s preemption proposal might undermine the OCC’s policymaking independence. As noted above, OCC’s autonomy is protected against interference by the Treasury Department in the same way that CFPB’s independence is shielded against infringement by the FRB.\footnote{See \textit{supra} notes 71-72, 81 and accompanying text.} In July 2011, Representative Randy Neugebauer (R-TX) launched an investigation of the Treasury Department’s decision to submit a public comment letter criticizing the OCC’s preemption proposal.\footnote{R. Christian Bruce, “Preemption: Neugebauer Seeks Records from Treasury, Cites Worries About Interference with OCC,” \textit{97 BNA’s Banking Report} 67 (July 12, 2011).} He declared that the comment letter “prompted concerns regarding the Treasury Department’s influence on OCC rulemaking,” and he requested “assurances that the Treasury has permitted the OCC to act independently in the rulemaking for this and all provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} (quoting letter from Rep. Neugebauer to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner).} A few weeks later, Senator Shelby expressed...
similar concerns about Treasury’s comment letter during the Senate Banking Committee’s hearing on Mr. Curry’s nomination for appointment as Comptroller.\textsuperscript{138}

As a matter of principle, the emphatic defense of OCC’s autonomy by Representative Neugebauer and Senator Shelby seems at odds with their insistence on stringent external controls over CFPB’s budget and rulemaking.\textsuperscript{139} Their diametrically opposed attitudes toward OCC and CFPB indicate that Republican leaders are “less concerned about the structural independence of federal financial regulatory agencies and . . . more concerned about whether those agencies issue regulations that support the interests of our largest financial institutions.”\textsuperscript{140}

One finds the same incongruity in the decade-long campaign by major banks and their legislative allies to create a strong independent regulator for Fannie and Freddie. That campaign culminated in Congress’ passage of a statute establishing FHFA in 2008.\textsuperscript{141} From 1999 to 2008, a coalition of large lenders and their trade associations (known first as “FM Watch” and later as “FM Policy Focus”) lobbied for legislation to rein in Fannie and Freddie. That coalition – which included the Financial Services Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo – raised a number of valid points, such as the systemic risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, their implicit government subsidies, their inadequate

\textsuperscript{138} Wack, supra note 134.
\textsuperscript{140} Bruce, supra note 136 (quoting my comments); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 139 (quoting Rep. Brad Miller, D-NC, who maintained that “[t]he financial industry always hated [CFPB] . . . [a]nd in my experience in Congress, what the financial industry wants, Republicans are usually perfectly willing to do”).
\textsuperscript{141} Kate Davidson, “Question of Hypocrisy in GOP Assault on the CFPB,” \textit{American Banker}, Mar. 21, 2011, at 1.

As noted above, FHFA is similar to CFPB because it has a single-Director governance model and does not depend on congressional appropriations for its funding.\footnote{See supra notes 82-84, 86-88 and accompanying text.} Major banks and their congressional allies helped to pass legislation ensuring that FHFA would be “a strong, independent regulator” with a secure funding source, thereby protecting FHFA against the threat of capture by the GSEs.\footnote{H.R. Rep. No. 110-142, at 87-92 (2007); see also Davidson, supra note 141; infra notes ___ and accompanying text (explaining that a top priority of FHFA’s supporters was to insulate FHFA from political capture by giving FHFA a secure funding source that would not be subject to congressional control).} The obvious inconsistency between the banking industry’s support for FHFA and its vehement opposition to CFPB provides further evidence that attacks on CFPB’s structure “are not born from a matter of principle, but just because [opponents] don’t like the CFPB.”\footnote{Davidson, supra note 141 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank).}

\section*{IV. The Changes to CFPB Demanded by the Financial Services Industry and Its Legislative Allies Would Seriously Impair CFPB’s Independence and Effectiveness}
As described above, the financial services industry has enthusiastically supported demands by Republican congressional leaders for fundamental changes in CFPB’s governance, powers and funding. Republican-backed legislation would establish a multimember board to govern CFPB, would increase the ability of prudential regulators to veto CFPB’s rules on “safety and soundness” grounds, and would require CFPB to obtain its funding through congressional appropriations. As shown below, each of those modifications would significantly impair CFPB’s ability to fulfill its statutory mission.

A. CFPB’s Director Should Not Be Replaced by a Multimember Commission

House Republicans passed legislation on July 21, 2011, that would create a five-member commission to administer CFPB in place of a single Director. As Adam Levitin has observed, “[t]he scholarly literature on agency design has not achieved any consensus” as to whether single agency heads are superior or inferior to multimember commissions. Administrative law scholars have generally described the two agency structures as offering relatively equal “trade-offs” between (1) greater “efficiency and accountability” within agencies administered by single officials and (2) increased “deliberation and debate” and “compromise” within multimember commissions. In contrast, a 1987 evaluation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) by the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) concluded that the superior administrative effectiveness of a single-director structure would outweigh any potential benefits of collegial decision-making within CPSC’s multimember commission.

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146 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing House passage of H.R. 1315).
149 Id.; Barkow, supra note 6, at 37-38.
150 The GAO report acknowledged that some CPSC officials supported the agency’s multimember commission structure because it encouraged an “exchange of ideas, and a mix of perspectives . . .
CPSC was “the inspiration” for CFPB’s creation.\textsuperscript{151} When Congress enacted legislation establishing CPSC in 1972, the agency’s proponents sought to create a powerful agency with a broad mandate to protect consumers from dangerous products.\textsuperscript{152} Consumer groups also supported the creation of a five-member commission for CPSC as a means of promoting wider expertise and political independence.\textsuperscript{153} However, CPSC is now “widely regarded as one of the least politically independent and influential agencies in government.”\textsuperscript{154}

Commentators have identified several reasons for CPSC’s lackluster record in protecting consumers, including its lack of a secure funding source (discussed below).\textsuperscript{155} GAO concluded in 1987 that CPSC’s multimember commission structure was ineffective and should be scrapped in favor of a single director.\textsuperscript{156} GAO found that CPSC’s leadership lacked stability and direction due to “high turnover” in the commission’s membership, squabbles among commissioners over resources, and delays in decision-making.\textsuperscript{157} GAO reported that “[s]even of the eight other health and safety regulatory agencies . . . have single administrators,” and the unified leadership

\begin{itemize}
  \item However, GAO reported that other CPSC officials criticized CPSC’s commission structure for creating serious administrative problems. \textit{Id.} at 2-4; see also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing CPSC’s administrative shortcomings). After reviewing “[a] number of studies, such as those by the Hoover Commission and the Ash Council . . . over the past 50 years on regulatory commissions,” GAO determined that “[a]ll of the studies we reviewed found some significant problems with the commission structure” and some studies “recommended replacing the multimember commissions with agencies headed by single administrators.” \textit{Id.} at 6.
  \item Barkow, \textit{supra} note 6, at 72.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 65-66.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 66-67.
  \item \textit{Id.} at 71 (noting that “[i]n its first five years, CPSC issued only one safety standard . . . and only seven safety standards after ten years”).
  \item \textit{Id.} at 65-71 (citing studies documenting CPSC’s lack of effectiveness); see also infra notes ____ and accompanying text (discussing CPSC’s vulnerability to political influence due to its reliance on congressional appropriations for funding).
  \item 1987 GAO-CPSC Report, \textit{supra} note 150, at 1-6.
  \item GAO-CPSC Report, \textit{supra} note 150, at 2-4.
\end{itemize}
structure of those agencies appeared to “enhance the decision-making process.”\textsuperscript{158} However, Congress did not adopt GAO’s recommendation to replace CPSC’s multimember commission with a single administrator.\textsuperscript{159}

Thus, the factors of efficiency, stability, decisiveness and accountability argue in favor of retaining CFPB’s single-Director model of governance. Creating a five-member commission would likely produce more delay and less consistency in CFPB’s decision-making. Moreover, a five-member commission would expose CFPB to the risk of leadership deadlock whenever a commissioner left office.\textsuperscript{160} This threat of institutional paralysis would be heightened if – as provided in the recently passed House bill – no more than three members of the commission could be affiliated with the same political party.\textsuperscript{161} Under that structure, the departure of any member of the majority would likely produce a commission that was even divided on a wide range of policy issues. During the past three decades, the lengthy vetting process for Presidential nominees and prolonged Senate confirmation battles have frequently resulted in persistent vacancies and policy deadlocks at agencies with multimember commissions.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 5-6.
\textsuperscript{159} Id. at 6; see also Barkow, supra note 6, at 71, 71 n.319.
\textsuperscript{160} In contrast, CFPB’s Deputy Director (when appointed by the Director) would have authority to “serve as acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(5).
\textsuperscript{161} Ferrulo, supra note 27 (describing H.R. 1315 as passed by the House of Representatives on July 21, 2011); Carter Dougherty & Phil Mattingly, “Republicans Propose Replacing Consumer Head With Commission,” Bloomberg.com, Mar. 16, 2011 (discussing the proposal by House Republicans for “replacing [CFPB’s] director with a five-member bipartisan commission”).
The financial services industry and House Republican leaders appear to recognize the potential shortcomings of multimember commissions, at least for financial regulatory agencies they support. The industry and its legislative allies have not attempted to establish multimember commissions to replace the single-administrator governance structures at OCC and FHFA. Indeed, the Republican leadership summarily rejected such a proposal during a recent House subcommittee vote on legislation to change CFPB’s structure. Representative Brad Miller (D-NC) introduced an amendment that would have authorized a multimember commission for OCC as well as CFPB, but his amendment was ruled “not germane” and out of order by Representative Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), the subcommittee’s chair. It is not intuitively obvious why Representative Miller’s OCC amendment was “not germane” if Republicans were truly seeking to establish an important principle of administrative law by changing CFPB’s governance structure to a multimember commission.

As noted above, a leading argument in favor of the multimember commission governance structure is that it encourages the agency to consider views from persons with a variety of backgrounds and perspectives. However, Dodd-Frank already requires CFPB’s Director to consult with a wide range of outside parties before making major policy decisions. First, the Director must seek advice from CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board, whose members will represent many different perspectives and backgrounds. Second, CFPB must consult with

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on Microsoft,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 22, 1993, at A1 (reporting that recusal of a commissioner produced a 2-2 vote that prevented the FTC from issuing an antitrust complaint against Microsoft).


See supra note 150 (describing arguments made by some CPSC officials in favor of a multimember commission).

Dodd-Frank requires CFPB’s Director to establish a Consumer Advisory Board that will meet at least twice each year. The purpose of that Advisory Board is “to advise and consult with [CFPB] in the exercise of its functions under the Federal consumer financial laws, and to provide information on emerging practices in the consumer financial products or services industry.” Dodd-Frank, § 1014(a).
other federal financial regulators before adopting any regulation, and CFPB must address any objections raised by those regulators in its notice of final rulemaking.\footnote{See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s obligation to consult with other regulators under Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b)(2), 1031(e)).} In particular, CFPB must take into account the “consistency” of each proposed regulation with “prudential, market, or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”\footnote{Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(B).} Third, CFPB must seek the advice of its small business advisory panel regarding the impact of any proposed regulation on the cost of credit for small businesses,\footnote{See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s duty to seek the recommendations of its small business advisory panel under Dodd-Frank § 1100G(b)).} and CFPB must also consider the effects of each proposed rule on consumers (especially those in rural areas) and smaller depository institutions.\footnote{See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s obligation to perform a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed rule).} Thus, CFPB’s Director is already obliged to consider the views of many interested parties before deciding to adopt a regulation. Superimposing a multimember commission on top of CFPB’s existing decision-making process would provide few if any benefits, and it would impose potentially significant costs on the bureau and the public.

**B. The Financial Stability Oversight Council Should Not Be Given an Enhanced Veto Power over CFPB’s Regulations**

**1. The House Legislation Would Enable Prudential Regulators to Block CFPB’s Regulations by Invoking “Safety and Soundness” Concerns Affecting Individual Banks**

The Republican-sponsored House bill would greatly strengthen FSOC’s ability to veto selecting the Board’s members, “the Director shall seek to assemble experts in consumer protection, financial services, community development, fair lending and civil rights, and consumer financial products or services,” as well as representatives of depository institutions that provide services to underserved communities and communities affected by high-cost mortgages. Id. § 1014(b).
regulations issued by CFPB.\textsuperscript{170} Currently, under Dodd-Frank, any agency represented on FSOC may file a petition to set aside a CFPB regulation, and the Treasury Secretary may stay the rule’s effectiveness for up to 90 days to facilitate FSOC’s consideration of the petition.\textsuperscript{171} Dodd-Frank authorizes FSOC’s members, by a two-thirds vote, to strike down a CFPB regulation if they determine that the rule “would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk.”\textsuperscript{172}

In contrast, under the House bill, a simple majority of FSOC’s members could vote to invalidate a CFPB regulation if they determine that the rule would be inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of U.S. financial institutions.\textsuperscript{173} Thus, the House bill would remove Dodd-Frank’s requirement that a CFPB regulation must have \textit{systemic} adverse effects (as opposed to a negative impact on \textit{individual} institutions) in order to justify FSOC’s veto. The House bill would also (i) bar CFPB’s Director from voting on any petition to set aside a CFPB regulation, and (ii) delete Dodd-Frank’s requirement that FSOC must act expeditiously on any such petition.\textsuperscript{174}

Hence, the House bill would enable federal prudential regulators to veto CFPB’s regulations by claiming that the challenged rules would impair the “safety and soundness” of individual financial institutions. The House bill would also permit the Treasury Secretary to approve indefinite suspensions of CFPB rules while FSOC considers veto petitions. As a

\textsuperscript{170} See \textit{supra} note 27 and accompanying text (discussing passage of H.R. 1315 by the House on July 21, 2011).

\textsuperscript{171} Dodd-Frank § 1023(b), (c). In order to file a petition, the agency must have attempted “in good faith” to work with CFPB in resolving the agency’s concerns about the regulation’s impact on the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system or the stability of the U.S. financial system. \textit{Id.} § 1023(b)(1)(A).

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Id.} § 1023(a), (c)(3). \textit{See supra} notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing FSOC’s authority to veto a CFPB regulation). As discussed above, there are ten voting members and five nonvoting members of FSOC. It is not entirely clear from the text of Section 1023 whether FSOC’s nonvoting members can vote on whether to set aside a CFPB regulation. \textit{See supra} note 112.

\textsuperscript{173} Bivins, \textit{supra} note 27.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id.} Dodd-Frank requires FSOC to act on an agency’s petition to set aside a CFPB rule within 45 days after the petition is filed, or within 90 days of that date if the Treasury Secretary has agreed to stay the rule’s effectiveness. Dodd-Frank § 1023(c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(B).
practical matter, federal prudential regulators would be able to block any CFPB rule if they believed that the rule would have an adverse impact on one or more financial institutions that were subjects of regulatory concern. As shown below, prudential regulators would be likely to exercise their veto power to protect the interests of their largest regulated constituents.

2. Prudential Regulators Failed to Protect Consumers or to Ensure the Safety and Soundness of Financial Institutions during the Credit Boom that Led to the Current Financial Crisis

The House bill is based on the unwarranted assumption that protecting consumers frequently injures the safety and soundness of financial institutions. While individual institutions may complain about particular consumer laws, the current financial crisis has demonstrated that appropriate consumer protection is essential to maintain the long-term safety and soundness of our financial system.\(^{175}\) As the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank pointed out, “[t]here was no evidence provided during [the committee’s] hearings that consumer protection regulations would put safety and soundness [of banks] at risk. To the contrary, there has been significant evidence and extensive testimony that the opposite was the case.”\(^{176}\)

The Senate committee report also explained that “the failure of the federal banking and other regulators to address significant consumer protection issues” during the subprime lending boom proved to be “detrimental to both consumers and the safety and soundness of the financial system.”

\(^{175}\) See Levitin, supra note 9, at 152 (“The events of 2007-2008 have also shown that . . . [c]onsumer protection must be seen as an essential component of systemic-risk protection. The failure to protect consumers has systemic externalities”). In 2005, Heidi Schooner presciently warned that “a bank that is involved in predatory lending practices not only harms consumers by charging undisclosed fees, but also may threaten the bank’s financial condition by systematically making overly risky loans.” Heidi Mandanis Schooner, “Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit,” 18 Loyola Consumer Law Review 43, 62 (2005).

\(^{176}\) Senate Report No. 111-176, at 166 (2010); see also id. (quoting the views of two senior former bank regulators – Kevin Jacques and Brad Sabel – who denied the existence of any conflict between consumer protection and safety and soundness regulation).
system.” The history of the financial crisis strongly supports the Senate committee’s view. As I have described in previous articles, federal regulators allowed large complex financial institutions (“LCFIs”) to become “the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis,” and LCFIs became “the epicenter of the current global financial mess.”

LCFIs provided most of the funding, directly or indirectly, for “almost 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans between 2003 and 2007, and by 2008 about $2 trillion of such loans were outstanding.” LCFIs securitized most of those nonprime loans, and securitization encouraged a steady decline in lending standards between 2003 and 2006. LCFIs believed – mistakenly – that they could successfully transfer the risks of nonprime loans by bundling the loans into mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and selling the MBS to far-flung investors. LCFIs had powerful incentives to originate (or buy) and securitize nonprime loans because they earned large fees from securitizing the loans and selling the MBS.

Thus, LCFIs financed a huge surge in nonprime lending that helped to generate a massive boom-and-bust cycle in the U.S. housing market. “Housing prices rose rapidly from 2001 to

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177 Id. at 9.
179 Wilmarth, supra note 178, at 1011-12, 1015-20, 1022-24 (showing that (i) LCFIs were the primary sources of funding, directly or indirectly, for most nonprime mortgages, (ii) about $3.7 trillion of subprime and Alt-A mortgages were originated between 2001 and 2006, and (iii) more than half of the nonprime loans originated between 2003 and 2007 were used to refinance existing loans).
180 Wilmarth, supra note 178, at 1020-27.
181 Id. at 994-96, 1024-27; Wilmarth, “Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,” supra note 51, at 963-64, 971-75.
2005, stopped rising in 2006, and began to fall sharply in 2007.” As I have previously explained, LCFIs played a central role in this disastrous credit cycle:

[B]y 2007, the health of the U.S. economy relied on a massive confidence game—indeed, some might say, a Ponzi scheme—operated by its leading financial institutions. This confidence game, which sustained the credit boom, could continue only as long as investors were willing to keep buying new debt instruments [underwritten by LCFIs] that would enable overstretched borrowers to expand their consumption and service their debts. In the summer of 2007, when investors lost confidence in the ability of subprime borrowers to meet their obligations, the game collapsed and a severe financial crisis began.

The rapid decline in home prices after 2006 triggered an abrupt shutdown in nonprime lending and cut off refinancing options for many borrowers. Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages in rapidly increasing numbers, which led to widespread foreclosures. Lenders foreclosed on five million homes by the end of 2010, and 4 million additional foreclosures are expected to occur in 2011 and 2012.

Accelerating defaults on home mortgages inflicted major losses on holders of MBS and other mortgage-related investments. Cascading losses on mortgage-related investments triggered a flight by investors from risky assets of all kinds, and that “flight to safety” unleashed a

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183 Id. at 1024.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1018-20, 1024.
186 Id. at 1024; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 897-98; see also Nick Timiraos, “Home Forecast Calls for Pain, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 2011, at A1 (reporting that “[o]ne in five Americans with a mortgage owes more than their home is worth, and $7 trillion of homeowners’ equity has been lost in the [housing] bust”).
systemic financial crisis. The financial crisis caused the failures or near-failures of many LCFIs and inflicted severe distress on the U.S. economy. To prevent the onset of a second Great Depression, the U.S. government spent $800 billion on economic stimulus and provided more than $6 trillion of assistance to financial institutions in the form of central bank loans and other government extensions of credit, guarantees, asset purchases and capital infusions. Notwithstanding these extraordinary measures, the U.S. economy is still struggling to escape a prolonged period of slow growth and high unemployment.

By giving prudential regulators an enhanced veto over CFPB’s regulations, the House bill would effectively put responsibility for consumer protection back in the hands of the same agencies that failed to protect both consumers and our financial markets during the past decade. The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank pointed out “the spectacular failure of the prudential regulators” to protect consumers from predatory nonprime mortgages. As the report explained, regulators failed to crack down on mortgages with “exploding” adjustable rates and other abusive features. Instead, “regulators ‘routinely sacrificed consumer protection for short-term profitability of banks’ . . . and Wall Street investment firms, despite the fact that so

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189 Id. at 957-59.


191 See Bivins, supra note 27 (“It makes no sense to give the same banking regulators who were asleep at the wheel before the last financial crisis more power to second guess the CFPB”) (quoting Pamela Banks, senior policy counsel for Consumers Union); Davidson & Adler, supra note 27 (quoting a similar comment by Rep. Barney Frank).


193 Id.
many people were raising the alarm about the problems these loans would cause.‖194 Moreover, OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory lending laws and state enforcement efforts and thereby “actively created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish without state controls.”195

Numerous studies have confirmed the Senate committee report’s findings concerning the shortcomings of federal prudential regulators.196 For example, FRB had authority under a 1994 federal statute to adopt rules to prohibit unfair or deceptive lending practices by all types of mortgage lenders.197 However, notwithstanding proposals for action by FRB staff members and many others, FRB failed to promulgate effective regulations until 2008, a year after the subprime mortgage market collapsed.198 Similarly, FRB declined to exercise its authority to regulate high-risk mortgage lending by nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies until 2007, again despite calls for action by FRB staff members and others.199

When indisputable evidence of the risks of subprime and Alt-A loans emerged in 2005, FRB, FDIC, OCC and OTS responded not with binding rules but instead with weak “guidance” that urged banks to follow prudent lending policies. The agencies’ guidance encouraged – but did not require – banks to verify each borrower’s ability to pay the fully-amortized rate on

194 Id. (quoting testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009).
195 Id. at 16-17.
196 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 157-205; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 120-32, 141-44; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at 81-95; Levitin, supra note 9, at 151-69; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 897-919.
197 See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 898-99 (discussing FRB’s authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive mortgage lending practices under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act).
199 Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 900-01; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 198-203; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 142-43; Binyamin Appelbaum, “As Subprime Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking,” Washington Post, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1
adjustable-rate mortgages. Federal regulators did not take meaningful steps to ensure compliance with their guidance until after the subprime crisis broke out.200

In the absence of effective federal regulation, more than thirty states passed laws to restrain predatory lending practices. However, OCC and OTS quickly issued a series of preemptive rulings that blocked the states from applying those laws to national banks, federal thrifts and their subsidiaries.201 In combination, federal regulatory inaction and federal preemption helped LCFIs that controlled national banks and federal thrifts to capture the lion’s share of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending markets during the peak of the housing boom between 2005 and 2007.202 Several of those federally-supervised LCFIs subsequently failed or required federal assistance to avoid failure.203

3. Four Factors Contributed to the Regulatory Failures That Occurred during the Subprime Lending Boom

Why didn’t federal regulators stop financial institutions from generating huge volumes of high-risk credit that exploited consumers, risked their own soundness and undermined the stability of the financial markets? At least four factors contributed to this systemic failure of regulation. First, during the credit boom banking agencies focused on near-term profitability as a

200 Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 901-03, 907-08; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 165-66, 168, 174, 176; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 143.
201 Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 909-15; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 157-62; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 143-44; Robert Berner & Brian Grow, “They Warned Us: The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Crisis Coming – and How They Were Thwarted by the Banks and Washington,” Business Week, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36.
202 Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 916-19; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 169-71, 176-81, 198-206; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 120-44. Twelve of the 15 largest subprime lenders in 2006 were subject to regulation by federal banking agencies, and those twelve lenders “controlled 50 percent of the subprime market.” Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 204; see also id. at 205 tbl. 10.1 (showing that OTS had jurisdiction over five of the top 15 subprime lenders in 2006, while FDIC had authority over one, FRB over three, and OCC over three).
203 Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 918-19 (citing failures of Washington Mutual and IndyMac, massive federal bailouts of American International Group (AIG) and Citigroup, and federally-assisted emergency acquisitions involving Countrywide, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia and National City); see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 169-71, 176-81, 200-03, 221-23 (discussing same transactions).
key indicator of the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions. Federal regulators therefore resisted proposals by consumer groups for tougher federal lending rules, and OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory lending laws that threatened to reduce bank profits from originating and securitizing nonprime loans. Banking agencies also declined to take tough enforcement actions to stop speculative lending and capital markets activities as long as banks continued to report large profits, despite misgivings among some regulators about the potential long-term risks of those activities.

Second, regulators competed – both within and across national borders – to attract the allegiance of major financial institutions. Regulatory competition encouraged agencies to follow polices that would please their existing regulated constituents and attract new ones. For example, OCC and OTS issued their preemptive rulings to help persuade state-chartered institutions that they should operate under federal charters as national banks or federal thrifts. OCC and OTS had strong financial incentives to induce depository institutions to operate as national banks or federal thrifts, because assessments paid by those institutions funded virtually all of OCC’s and OTS’ budgets.

In addition, federal regulators competed amongst themselves to enlarge their stables of regulatory clients. For example, FRB and OCC each sought to attract the patronage of major

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204 Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 173-76; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at 90-95; Levitin, supra note 9, at 152-57; U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Collapse: Majority and Minority Staff Report (April 13, 2011) [hereinafter Senate Wall Street Report], at 4-5, 224-26..
206 Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 157-62; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 143-44; Levitin, supra note 9, at 163-69; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 910-17.
207 Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 159-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 9, at 90-94; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 915-16.
banks by approving new activities and reducing regulatory requirements.\footnote{Wilmarth, supra note , at 265, 265 n.150, 275-77, 277 n.203; see also supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text (explaining that OCC has consistently supported the interests of national banks). Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 61-67, 466-67, 491-94 (describing competition between OCC and FRB during the 1990s to maintain the loyalty of the largest banks, which could choose between status as national banks or as state Fed member banks); Richard M. Whiting, “The New ‘Tri-Partite’ Banking System,” 17 Banking Policy Report (Aspen) No. 7, at 1, 14-15 (April 6, 1998) (same, and noting that “overt rivalry” between OCC and FRB produced “expansive regulatory actions” by both agencies).} Similarly, OTS persuaded Countrywide to convert from a national bank to a federal thrift in early 2007 by promising that OTS would give Countrywide more favorable supervisory treatment.\footnote{Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 159-60; Levitin, supra note 9, at 159-60.} Thus, efforts by federal agencies to attract the allegiance of large institutions resulted in domestic regulatory arbitrage and lax regulation.\footnote{Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 159-66; Levitin, supra note 9, at 155-60.}

OTS compiled the most egregious record of regulatory laxity, and Congress decided to abolish OTS when it passed Dodd-Frank.\footnote{Senate Report No. 111-176, at 25-26 (2010); see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 174-84 (describing OTS’ regulatory failures); Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, “Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail,” Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (same).} For example, OTS granted extraordinary forbearance to Washington Mutual (―WaMu‖), the biggest federal thrift with $300 billion of assets. WaMu’s assessments accounted for about one-seventh of OTS’ total revenues, and OTS Director John Reich referred to WaMu in 2007 as “my largest constituent.”\footnote{Senate Wall Street Report, supra note 204, at 165, 210.} OTS examiners uncovered “more than 500 serious operational deficiencies” in WaMu’s lending and risk management practices between 2004 and 2008.\footnote{Id. at 209.} However, OTS continued to rate WaMu as “fundamentally sound” until February 2008, and OTS failed to take any public enforcement action against WaMu prior to its failure in September 2008.\footnote{Id. at 161-62, 177, 209-30. In addition, from 2006 to 2008 OTS limited FDIC’s ability to examine WaMu and obstructed FDIC’s efforts to take more vigorous supervisory measures against WaMu. Id. at 196-208.} A Senate investigation concluded...
that OTS’ forbearance toward WaMu “reflected an OTS culture of deference to bank management, demoralized examiners whose oversight efforts were unsupported by their supervisors, and a narrow regulatory focus that allowed short-term profits to excuse high risk activities and disregarded systemic risk.”

Cross-border competition with foreign regulators also encouraged federal banking agencies to bend to the wishes of major banks. Regulators worried that any decision to impose stricter supervision on large U.S. financial institutions would cause those institutions to shift more of their operations to London and other foreign locations that offered “light touch” regulation. Federal agencies therefore repeatedly offered regulatory accommodations in an effort to persuade LCFIs to keep more of their assets in the U.S. Thus, international as well as

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215 Id. at 209. Federal investigators and commentators strongly criticized OTS for similar regulatory lapses that contributed to the failures of other leading thrifts, including IndyMac and Downey Federal. Id. at 233-35; Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 176-81; Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 211.


217 Wójcik, supra note 216, at 7; Ford, supra note 216, at 17-18. During the quarter century leading up to the financial crisis, U.S. banking regulators sought to avoid imposing capital requirements on large U.S. banks that would place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign banks. Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation 45-64, 84-85, 210-14 (Aug. 2008). For example, in 2004 federal regulators adopted an interagency rule setting a very low capital charge for banks that provided backup lines of credit to their sponsored off-balance-sheet conduits. Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 974. In agreeing to that very lenient treatment, regulators noted that a proposed higher capital charge “would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign banks.” Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 44908, 44910 (July 28, 2004).

U.S. banking agencies were not mistaken in fearing that LCFIs would shift operations and assets to jurisdictions with more accommodating regulatory schemes. A recent study found that, between 1996 and 2007, global banks headquartered in 26 developed countries were significantly more likely to transfer
domestic regulatory competition discouraged federal regulators from adopting tougher policies that might have restrained speculative activities during the period leading up to the financial crisis.

Third, during the past three decades, financial regulators and Wall Street officials developed a “confluence of perspectives and opinions” in which “Wall Street’s positions became the conventional wisdom in Washington.” Regulators maintained continuous contacts with LCFIs through (i) frequent consultations with bank representatives on important regulatory initiatives, and (ii) “dedicated examiner teams” that maintained permanent on-site offices at the largest banks and worked closely with bank managers. Regulators and industry insiders also shared close “social, educational, or experiential ties.” In contrast, regulators largely dismissed the views of consumer advocates and other outsiders, who lacked access to confidential supervisory information and frequently did not have specialized expertise related to derivatives and other financial innovations.


218 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 92-97.
220 Ford, supra note 216, at 23.
221 Omarova, supra note 219, at 13, 32-33 (describing the “secretive, closed-door nature of the decision-making process involving financial regulators and industry actors”); see also Ford, supra note 216, at 23 (“Regulators operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and expertise-based band of human experience, characterized by relationships with sophisticated repeat players. . . . [Regulators] may be cognitively predisposed against ‘outsiders’ who either lack facility with the dominant jargon or who take issue with assumptions that no one in the industry take[s] issue with”); Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 94 (“Financial policy took on the trappings of a branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on the cutting edge of innovation were qualified to comment”); Appelbaum, supra note 199 (reporting that FRB officials repeatedly dismissed warnings by consumer advocates about the dangers posed by nonprime mortgage lending).
The “‘revolving door’ phenomenon” produced even closer relationships between regulators and industry leaders.\textsuperscript{222} LCFIs regularly hired “former agency employees familiar with the inner workings of the regulatory process.”\textsuperscript{223} Conversely, “as the world of finance became more complicated and more central to the economy,” the federal government increasingly relied on Wall Street veterans to fill senior regulatory positions.\textsuperscript{224} The continuous movement of senior officials between Wall Street and Washington encouraged regulators “to view their institutional interests or mission as largely congruent with the interests of their regulated industry constituency.”\textsuperscript{225}

Consequently, the aggressive deregulatory policies pursued by Alan Greenspan during his tenure as FRB chairman between 1987 and 2006 were not an aberration. Rather, Greenspan’s policies reflected a widely-shared regulatory “mindset,” which included great faith in the ability of financial markets to “self-correct” and great skepticism about the federal government’s ability to regulate wisely or effectively.\textsuperscript{226} Officials who disagreed with that mindset “were marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright new world of modern finance.”\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{222} Omarova, supra note 219, at 13; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 93-97.
\textsuperscript{223} Omarova, supra note 219, at 13; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 94-96.
\textsuperscript{224} Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 92-95.
\textsuperscript{225} Omarova, supra note 217, at 13; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 93, 95 (“[A]s banking insiders gained power and influence in Washington, the positions they held . . . became orthodoxy inside the Beltway . . . [G]roupthink was a major reason why the federal government deferred to the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in the 1990s and 2000s”).
\textsuperscript{226} Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 898-906; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 167-96; Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 97-109, 133-43.
\textsuperscript{227} Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 97; see also id. at 103 (describing how International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) chief economist Raghuram Rajan “was met with a torrent of attacks by Greenspan’s defenders,” including FRB vice chairman Donald Kohn and Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, when “Rajan presented a paper [in August 2005] asking in prophetic tones about whether deregulation and innovation had increased rather than decreased risk in the financial system”); id. at 7–9, 135–37 (explaining that (i) CFTC chairman Brooksley Born “provoked furious opposition” when the CFTC issued a concept paper in May 1998, proposing a study of whether to strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives; and (ii) Ms. Born’s opponents—including Greenspan, Summers, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and SEC
Fourth, regulators were well aware of the enormous political clout wielded by large financial institutions and their allies. The financial sector (including finance, insurance and real estate firms) spent $5.1 billion on lobbying and campaign contributions between 1998 and 2008. The financial sector was the “leading contributor to political campaigns” after 1990, and it accounted for 15% of total lobbying expenditures by all industry sectors between 1999 and 2006.

The financial sector employed nearly 3,000 registered lobbyists in 2007. In 2008 and 2009, the six largest banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) employed more than 240 lobbyists who previously worked in the Executive Branch or Congress. Financial firms that were heavily involved in political lobbying also engaged in more risky activities. An IMF staff study determined that financial firms that engaged in the most intensive lobbying between 1999 and 2006 also made higher-risk mortgage loans, securitized more of their loans, and suffered above-average losses in their stock market values during the financial crisis.

The financial sector received excellent legislative returns on its huge political investments. A second IMF staff study found that lobbying expenditures by financial firms

chairman Arthur Levitt—persuaded Congress to pass legislation barring the CFTC from acting on its proposal).

229 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 9, at 90; see also Levitin, supra note 9, at 160-61 (“The financial-services industry has been the single largest contributor to congressional campaigns since 1990”).
231 Sold Out, supra note 228, at 15-16, 100-01.
233 Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 230, at 4-6, 19-20, 22, 24-27.
significantly increased the likelihood of passage for bills favored by the financial services industry and also increased the probability of defeat for bills opposed by the industry.\textsuperscript{234}

Lobbying by the financial sector helped to produce a series of landmark political victories between 1994 and 2005, including enactment of (i) interstate banking legislation in 1994,\textsuperscript{235} (ii) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) in 1999,\textsuperscript{236} (iii) the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) in 2000,\textsuperscript{237} and (iv) bankruptcy reform legislation in 2005.\textsuperscript{238} In addition to those affirmative victories, the financial services industry successfully blocked passage of more than a dozen bills introduced between 2000 and 2007 that would have imposed tighter restrictions on high-risk mortgage lending.\textsuperscript{239}

Federal financial regulators who recommended tougher restraints on financial institutions experienced strong “pushback” from the industry.\textsuperscript{240} Regulators’ career interests and incentives


\textsuperscript{235}See Wilmarth, \textit{supra} note 178, at 1012-13 (describing the significance of Congress’ passage of interstate banking legislation, which “made possible the establishment of large nationwide banking organizations”); Johnson & Kwak, \textit{supra} note 9, at 89 (same).

\textsuperscript{236}For discussions of the importance of GLBA, which repealed key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed commercial banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by forming financial holding companies, see Johnson & Kwak, \textit{supra} note 9, at 89, 91-92, 133-34; Wilmarth, \textit{supra} note 178, at 973-75.

\textsuperscript{237}See Johnson & Kwak, \textit{supra} note 9, at 8-9, 92, 134-37 (describing CFMA, which largely exempted over-the-counter derivatives from federal regulation).

\textsuperscript{238}The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) “radically altered the policies underlying consumer bankruptcy . . . , marking a significant shift in favor of creditors,” because BAPCA made it much more difficult for consumers to obtain a substantial or complete discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. Ronald J. Mann, “Bankruptcy Reform and the ‘Sweat Box’ of Credit Card Debt,” 2007 \textit{University of Illinois Law Review} 375, 376-77; see also Eugene R. Wedoff, “Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA.” 2007 \textit{University of Illinois Law Review} 31 (surveying the changes made by BAPCPA to consumer bankruptcy statutes).

\textsuperscript{239}Igan, Mishra & Tressel, \textit{supra} note 230, at 17-18, 55-59 (Appendix).

\textsuperscript{240}Wilmarth, \textit{supra} note 9, at 907-08; \textit{The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States} (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC Report], at 20-22, 172-73, 307; see also Johnson & Kwak, \textit{supra} note 9, at 7-9, 97, 134-37; Tung & Henderson, \textit{supra} note 205, at 29-30; \textit{Sold Out, supra} note 228, at 8, 42-49 (noting that
discouraged them from challenging the formidable political power wielded by LCFIs and their allies.\textsuperscript{241} Deregulation and forbearance were safer alternatives for regulators, especially during a period of apparently unprecedented prosperity for the financial sector.\textsuperscript{242}

4. CFPB Is Likely To Be More Resistant to Regulatory Capture than the Federal Banking Agencies

In view of the financial services industry’s success in securing extensive forbearance from federal bank regulators during the past two decades, why should we expect CFPB to be more resistant to industry pressure? There are at least two major reasons for optimism. First, CFPB ‘s unified mission makes it different from most federal banking agencies. As described above, prudential regulators typically gave short shrift to consumer protection and instead focused on increasing the banking industry’s “safety and soundness” by adopting policies that promoted higher short-term profits for banks.\textsuperscript{243} In contrast, CFPB has a single clear mandate to protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, abusive or discriminatory practices.\textsuperscript{244} While Dodd-Frank requires CFPB to consider the potential costs and benefits of its proposed rules, and to respond to safety-and-soundness concerns raised by prudential regulators, CFPB’s consumer protection mission remains paramount. The unambiguous primacy of that mission should motivate CFPB to take its statutory responsibilities seriously.\textsuperscript{245}

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\begin{itemize}
    \item “officials in government who dared to proposed stronger protections for investors and consumers consistently met with hostility and defeat”).
    \item Tung & Henderson, \textit{supra} note 205, at 28-30
    \item Johnson & Kwak, \textit{supra} note 9, at 7-9, 97, 103-09, 134-43, 152; FCIC Report, \textit{supra} note 240, at 173, 307.
    \item See \textit{supra} notes 192-205 and accompanying text; Bar-Gill & Warren, \textit{supra} note 9, at 90-91; Levitin, \textit{supra} note 9, at 155-56.
    \item Dodd-Frank § 1021(b); S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 11, 164 (2010).
    \item Bar-Gill & Warren, \textit{supra} note 9, at 98-100. By maintaining CFPB’s single-Director governance structure, Congress would enhance CFPB’s accountability to the public for carrying out its consumer protection mission. See Levitin Testimony, \textit{supra} note 113, at 11 (“A CFPB Director who . . . fails to do enough to protect consumers cannot deflect blame for his actions”).
\end{itemize}
Second, CFPB’s institutional safeguards— including its policymaking autonomy and its assured source of funding\(^{246}\) — make it substantially more insulated from industry capture compared to OCC, CFTC, SEC and FRB. As shown in the preceding section, OCC relies for most of its funding on assessments paid by national banks, and OCC could lose significant funding if major national banks converted to state-chartered banks. OCC therefore has powerful budgetary incentives to please its largest regulatory constituents.\(^{247}\) As discussed in the next section, CFTC and SEC rely on congressional appropriations and are therefore highly vulnerable to budgetary leverage exerted by congressional allies of their regulated constituents.

FRB is not subject to the same type of industry-related budgetary pressures. FRB and the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) as a whole finance their operations by drawing on earnings from the Fed’s investment portfolio of Treasury securities and other debt instruments.\(^{248}\) However, the Fed is subject to significant industry influence due to the unique governance structure for the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks (“Reserve Banks”).\(^{249}\) Member banks in each Fed district elect three Class A directors and three Class B directors for that district’s Reserve Bank, while FRB appoints three Class C directors. In each district, Class B directors and Class C directors vote jointly to select the Reserve Bank’s president. Thus, member banks elect two-thirds of the directors of each Reserve Bank, and member banks indirectly exercise (through Class B directors) shared control over the selection of Reserve Bank presidents.\(^{250}\) As described below,

\(^{246}\) See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s autonomy and its guaranteed source of funding from the Fed).

\(^{247}\) See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.

\(^{248}\) Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 62.


\(^{250}\) GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 249, at 10-13. Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Class A directors also voted to elect Reserve Bank presidents, and member banks therefore controlled the
the boards of directors of Reserve Banks are frequently dominated by senior executives drawn from major banks, large financial firms and leading nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the biggest banks.

The voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”), which determines the nation’s monetary policy, include FRB’s seven governors and five Reserve Bank presidents. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York Fed”) is a permanent FOMC voting member, while four FOMC voting seats rotate among the remaining 11 Reserve Bank presidents. All 12 Reserve Bank presidents are entitled to attend and participate in FOMC meetings. In addition, each Reserve Bank is responsible (under FRB’s oversight) for examining and supervising state member banks and bank holding companies headquartered in the Reserve Bank’s district. Thus, Reserve Bank presidents play significant roles in the Fed’s monetary policy decisions and bank supervisory policies.

Class A directors of Reserve Banks are typically senior bank executives. In contrast, Class B and Class C directors may not serve as directors, officers or employees of banks. In addition, Class C directors may not own any bank stocks. FRB designates one Class C director as the chairman of the board for each Reserve Bank, and that chairman is required by statute to have “tested banking experience.” The Federal Reserve Act provides that Class B and Class C

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selection of presidents through their ability to elect Class A and Class B directors. Dodd-Frank removed the right of Class A directors to vote for Reserve Bank presidents, so that the power to select presidents is now divided equally between Class B directors (elected by member banks) and Class C directors (appointed by FRB). *Id.* at 10, 53; H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 876 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 732.

251 GAO Fed Governance Report, *supra* note 249, at 6-9, 14-16.

252 *Id.* at 7.


directors should “represent the public . . . with due but not exclusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor and consumers.”

A recent study found that “class A [Reserve Bank] directorships are dominated by large banks.” The study determined that bank size was the most significant factor in determining whether a particular bank was represented by a Class A director between 1987 and 2009, while factors related to bank performance were much less important. For example, Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase – the nation’s largest bank – serves as a Class A director of the New York Fed.

Despite their statutory role as representatives of the public, Class B and Class C directors are often been drawn from the ranks of senior executives of large financial companies and big nonfinancial corporations that are clients of major banks. For example, Richard Fuld, chairman of Lehman Brothers, served as a Class B director of the New York Fed until shortly before his firm declared bankruptcy in September 2008. During 2008 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of directors also included Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric (a Class B director), and Stephen Friedman, a director and former chairman of Goldman Sachs (a Class C director), whom FRB designated as chairman of the board of the New York Fed. A recent GAO study on Fed governance determined that 56 of 105 Reserve Bank directors in 2010 had

256 Adams, supra note 249, at 22-25.
257 Id.
“financial industry experience,” while only 11 directors who served between 2006 and 2010 were “consumer representatives” or “labor representatives.” Class B and Class C directors of Reserve Banks have also included senior executives of major nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the largest banks.

Stephen Friedman’s service as a Class C director and as chairman of the board of the New York Fed provoked widespread criticism. FRB issued a waiver that allowed Friedman to continue serving in both roles after Goldman converted to a bank holding company in September 2008, even though Friedman owned 46,000 shares of Goldman stock and ordinarily would have been disqualified from serving as a Class C director without divesting that stock. Friedman also purchased 37,000 additional shares of Goldman stock while his waiver request was pending, and during that period the New York Fed directed AIG to pay $14 billion to Goldman, representing full payment of AIG’s obligations to Goldman under credit default swaps (“CDS”). Moreover, Friedman led the search committee for a new president of the New York Fed.

263 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 249, at 33-34, 35 (fig. 10).
264 Aaron Lorenzo, “Investigations: House Panel Delving Deeper Into Holdings Of Former New York Fed Chair in Goldman,” 94 BNA’s Banking Report 551 (Mar. 23, 2010); Letter dated Mar. 18, 2010, from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to FRB Chairman Ben S. Bernanke [hereinafter House Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship], available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Correspondence/3-18-10-Honorable_Ben_Bernanke-Chairman_Board_of_Gov-AIG.pdf. After the Fed and the Treasury Department rescued AIG in September 2008, the New York Fed directed AIG to pay off its obligations to CDS counterparties at “100% of face value,” a decision that provoked sharp criticism from two government oversight bodies. AIG paid Goldman $14 billion to discharge CDS obligations, and Goldman was the second-largest recipient of CDS payments from AIG. FCIC Report, supra note 240, at 376-79 (listing AIG’s payments to CDS counterparties, including Goldman, and citing strong criticisms of those payments in two reports.
Fed after Timothy Geithner left that position to become Treasury Secretary, and the New York Fed ultimately selected William Dudley, Goldman’s former chief economist, as its new president. Friedman resigned as a Class C director and as chairman of the New York Fed in May 2009, after his dual role became “Exhibit A for what critics perceive as a too-cozy relationship between the New York Fed, which serves as the central bank’s eyes and ears on Wall Street, and the bankers it oversees.”

The GAO warned that “[h]aving the Class A directors, who represent member banks, and the Class B directors, who are elected by member banks . . . creates an appearance of a conflict of interest.” The GAO found that this perceived conflict of interest was accentuated during the financial crisis, because “at least 18 former and current Class A, B and C directors from 9 Reserve Banks . . . were affiliated with institutions that used at least one [Fed-administered] emergency program.” For example, the New York Fed provided emergency assistance to a major bank and three large financial firms while executives of all four organizations served as directors of the New York Fed.

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265 Irwin, supra note 259; Lanman, supra note 260.
266 Irwin, supra note 259; see also House Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship, supra note 264 (declaring that “Mr. Friedman’s dual role at the New York Fed and Goldman, his purchase of Goldman stock in December 2008, and the Federal Reserve’s waiver of his conflict of its conflict of interest policy after the fact, raise serious questions about the integrity of the Fed’s operations”).
267 GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 249, at 41; see also id. at 32 (stating that Reserve Bank “directors’ affiliations with financial firms . . . continue to pose reputational risks to the Federal Reserve System”: Cheyenne Hopkins, “Crisis or No, Debate Over Reg Reform Splintering,” American Banker, May 21, 2009, at 1 (quoting Senator Shelby’s statement during a Senate committee hearing that “[a]n inherent web of conflict is built into the DNA of the Fed as it now exists”); Sloan, supra note 262 (quoting Kevin Jacques, a prominent academic, who described the governance structure for Federal Reserve Banks as “really, really clubby”).
269 Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase, served as a Class A director of the New York Fed while his bank “participated in various emergency programs and served as one of the clearing banks for emergency lending programs” administered by the New York Fed. Id. at 40; Donna Borak, “GAO Fears Conflicts of Interest at Fed,” American Banker, Oct. 20, 2011, at 2. Similarly, as previously noted
Two academic studies found that banks were significantly more likely to receive capital assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") if their executives served as directors of either Reserve Banks or Reserve Bank branches. A third study determined that (i) banks whose executives were elected as Reserve Bank Class A directors between 1990 and 2009 experienced significant abnormal gains in their stock market values, and (ii) banks whose executives served as Reserve Bank directors during that 20-year period were significantly less likely to fail (compared with other banks), and none of those banks failed after receiving government assistance. The foregoing evidence indicates that large financial institutions have exerted substantial influence on Fed policies through their election of bank executives and client executives as Reserve Bank directors.

In contrast to OCC and the Fed, FDIC has demonstrated a significantly higher degree of independence from industry influence. Like CFPB, FDIC has a clearly defined mission and an assured source of funding. FDIC views its fundamental purpose as protecting bank depositors and defending the integrity of the Deposit Insurance Fund ("DIF"). FDIC also has a guaranteed funding source that is not subject to congressional control or vulnerable to charter

executives of three major financial firms served as directors of the New York Fed while their institutions participated in Fed emergency programs. Richard Fuld, chairman of Lehman Brothers, and Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric, served as Class B directors, while Stephen Friedman, a director and former chairman of Goldman Sachs, served as a Class C director and as chairman of the board. GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 249, at 33-36, 39; Borak, supra.


271 Adams, supra note 249, at 28-39.

272 David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 219-20 (2009) (stating that FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair was “a fierce and relentless defender of the FDIC fund [during the financial crisis], putting protection of that kitty above all else”); Tom Fox, “How the FDIC got to the top of the heap: The No. 1-ranked agency’s leader extols his workers’ sense of purpose,” Washington Post, Nov. 24, 2011, at B4 (quoting Acting FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg’s view that “[t]he great strength of the [FDIC] is that it has a very clear and understandable mission, and that mission is to insure the deposits that people have in federally insured financial institutions”).
competition. FDIC collects risk-adjusted assessments from FDIC-insured institutions, and virtually all banks operate with FDIC insurance.273

FDIC has frequently demonstrated its commitment to protecting the DIF as well as its willingness to resist banking industry influence. Over the past three decades, bank representatives have repeatedly criticized the agency for imposing higher capital requirements on banks in order to safeguard the DIF. Critics have mocked FDIC’s acronym as standing for “Forever Demanding Increased Capital.”274 For example, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, FDIC fought hard to maintain tougher capital rules for U.S. banks (including leverage capital requirements) during international negotiations over the Basel II capital accord. FDIC also strongly questioned the reliability of Basel II’s “advanced internal risk-based” (“A-IRB”) method for determining capital requirements. In contrast, the Fed aligned itself with the largest banks in pushing for incorporation of the A-IRB methodology into the Basel II accord.275 FDIC’s deep skepticism about the A-IRB approach proved to be well-founded when LCFIs relied on

273 Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 78, at 62-63, 316-18; Michael P. Malloy, Principles of Bank Regulation § 1.11 at 36 (West Concise Hornbook, 3d ed. 2011).
274 For examples of this mocking description of FDIC, see “FDIC Chief Earned Rep As A Consumer Advocate,” All Things Considered (National Public Radio, June 27, 2011 (transcript available on Lexis) (quoting banking industry consultant Bert Ely’s use of the same description); Barbara A. Rehm, “Editor at Large: Endgame for Bair Is No Less Audacious,” American Banker, Nov. 18, 2010, at 1 (quoting same description, and reporting that FDIC has consistently been the strongest proponent of tougher capital rules for banks); Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr., “Comment: Issuing Trust-Preferred Too Good a Game to Sit Out,” American Banker, Dec. 21, 1998 (quoting same description of FDIC); Jed Horowitz, “Let ‘Em Eat Leverage,” American Banker, Oct. 3, 1990, at 2 (same); Paul M. Horvitz, “The Increase in Capital Standards Will Make Banking Safer,” American Banker, Aug. 24, 1988, at 4 (quoting same description, and noting that “FDIC wants increased capital because bank capital provides a cushion for the insurance system against losses due to bank failures,” while “[b]ankers oppose higher capital standards because they fear that higher capital ratios result in a lower return on equity”);”Washington’s Financial Cops at a Glance: American Banker Guide to the Regulators,” Oct. 21, 1984, at 29 (quoting same description); Paul S. Nadler, “A Conference of Directors in Michigan Shows Banking Communications at Work,” American Banker, Nov. 17, 1980, at 4 (quoting same description, and noting that “bankers and board members agreed that a bank should try to get away with as little capital as possible”).
internal risk-based models “to operate with capital levels that were ‘very, very low, . . .
unacceptably low’ during the period leading up to the financial crisis.”

During the crisis, FDIC chairman Sheila Bair disagreed with Fed and Treasury officials
on several occasions about the desirability of establishing bailout programs for large troubled
financial institutions. For example, FDIC refused to concur with the Fed and Treasury in using
the “systemic risk exception” (“SRE”) to protect WaMu’s bondholders when WaMu failed on
September 25, 2008. Bair insisted that WaMu’s uninsured bondholders, rather than the DIF and
taxpayers, should bear the losses caused by WaMu’s reckless lending policies. Similarly,
FDIC originally resisted proposals by Treasury and the Fed to use the SRE on two subsequent
occasions: (i) on September 29, 2008, when federal officials invoked the SRE to protect
uninsured creditors (including bondholders) when Wachovia failed, and (ii) in October 2008,
when federal officials approved a program to guarantee debt securities issued by FDIC-insured
banks. On both occasions, Fed and Treasury officials exerted great pressure to overcome Bair’s
reluctance to expose the DIF to potential losses by invoking the SRE.

FDIC also demonstrated a much tougher attitude than the Fed and OCC when the largest
banks sought to exit the TARP capital assistance program by repurchasing the preferred stock
they had sold to Treasury. From November 2009 to June 2011, FDIC tried unsuccessfu1ly to
force several major banks (including Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC) to issue to

276 WilmARTH, “Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,” supra note 51, at 1010 (quoting “Base Camp Basel,” Economist
277 Id. at 1001, 1022-23 (discussing the SRE embodied in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), and noting that
concurrence among the Treasury, Fed and FDIC is required to invoke the SRE).
278 Wessel, supra note 272, at 218-21 (explaining that New York Fed President Timothy Geithner argued
strongly that the SRE should have been invoked to authorize FDIC to protect bondholders when WaMu
failed, but Fed chairman Ben Bernanke agreed with FDIC chairman Bair’s position that the SRE should
not be used): FCIC Report, supra note 240, at 365-66 (stating that Treasury officials also disagreed with
Chairman Bair’s position)
279 Wessel, supra note 272, at 221-23, 232-33; FCIC Report, supra note 240, at 366-69.
investors at least $1 in new common stock for every $2 of TARP preferred stock they repurchased from Treasury. FDIC insisted on the 1-for-2 ratio in order to “increase the quality” of the seven banks’ capital structures and limit the risk those banks posed to the DIF.\textsuperscript{280} However, OCC pushed for much more lenient terms for the big banks, and FRB took an intermediate position. Over the FDIC’s objections, regulators ultimately allowed the banks to repurchase their TARP preferred stock while failing to meet the 1-for-2 ratio advocated by FDIC.\textsuperscript{281}

Former FRB Vice Chairman Donald Kohn summarized the positions of the three agencies in the following terms: “[W]hile FDIC wanted the 1-for-2 to be met entirely with new common stock, ‘the OCC was much more relaxed than that, and [FRB] was a little more relaxed than the FDIC.’\textsuperscript{282} Similarly, FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo explained that “FDIC was understandably concerned about its exposure to institutions through [its debt guarantee program] and the deposit insurance fund, [while] OCC tends to look more narrowly at specific national banks with less of a macro perspective.”\textsuperscript{283}

In sum, FDIC’s clearly-defined mission and its secure source of funding have encouraged the agency to act with more independence from the banking industry, compared to OCC and the Fed. A recent study concluded that, although FDIC’s made some supervisory mistakes during the subprime lending boom, its overall regulatory record during the subprime lending boom was better than that of OCC and the Fed.\textsuperscript{284} The FDIC’s greater willingness to resist industry

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    \item \textsuperscript{280} “Exiting TARP: Repayments by the Largest Financial Institutions,” SIGTARP Audit Report 11-005 (Sept. 29, 2011), at 17-63 (quotes at 19-30).
    \item \textsuperscript{281} Id. at 20-63.
    \item \textsuperscript{282} Id. at 20 (quoting Mr. Kohn’s remarks to SIGTARP).
    \item \textsuperscript{283} Id. (summarizing Mr. Tarullo’s statement to SIGTARP).
    \item \textsuperscript{284} Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 157-205; see also id. at 163 (noting that state banks supervised by FDIC and FRB recorded much lower default rates on their mortgage loans from 2006 to 2008 compared to national banks regulated by OCC and federal thrifts regulated by OTS); id. at 184-87 (criticizing FDIC
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influence indicates that CFPB’s unambiguous mission and assured funding should encourage a similarly independent attitude within CFPB.285

C. Requiring CFPB to Depend on Congressional Appropriations for Its Budget Would Make CFPB Vulnerable to Political and Industry Capture

The Republican-sponsored House legislation would remove a crucial guarantee of CFPB’s autonomy by giving Congress complete control over CFPB’s budget.286 Any regulatory agency that depends on Congress for its budget is vulnerable to political influence exerted by the regulated industry through the appropriations process.287 For example, Congress controls CPSC’s budget, and since its creation in 1980 the agency has been “chronically underfunded and understaffed. . . . As a result, CPSC has been no match for the industry participants it is charged with regulating.”288

Except for CFTC and SEC, no federal financial regulator is subject to congressional appropriations.289 Congress has undermined the effectiveness of CFTC and SEC over the past

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285 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 44-45, 76-78 (concluding that that CFPB’s “guaranteed funding stream” from the Fed provides the bureau with significant insulation against industry capture).

286 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing a Republican-backed House bill that would make CFPB’s entire budget subject to congressional appropriations).

287 Barkow, supra note 6, at 42-44.

288 Id. at 67; see also id. at 42 n.103, 44, 67 (describing CPSC’s lack of adequate resources to fulfill its statutory mandate, due to Congress’ refusal to increase its budget); Andrew Zajac, “New leadership on U.S. product safety: Obama vows to revitalize ailing CPSC,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 2009, at C14 (reporting that CPSC had been “underfunded for years” and had only 430 employees in 2009, compared with 978 in 1980; as a result, the “gutted agency became a docile captive of the industry it regulates”).

two decades by frequently failing to provide those agencies with adequate funds.290 After Republicans took control of the House in the 2010 midterm elections, Republican leaders announced plans to delay the implementation Dodd-Frank’s reforms of the derivatives and securities markets by squeezing the budgets of CFTC and SEC.291 Incoming House majority leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) reportedly said that “denying funds to the SEC and other agencies is ‘what the American people are expecting.’”292

During 2011, Republicans blocked any significant increases in the CFTC’s and SEC’s operating budgets.293 At congressional oversight hearings in December 2011, CFTC chairman Gary Gensler and SEC chairman Mary Schapiro expressed grave doubts about their agencies’ ability to adopt and enforce the new regulations required by Dodd-Frank unless Congress

290 Speech by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro: Brodsky Family Lecture at Northwestern University Law School (Nov. 9, 2010) (stating that, when Ms. Schapiro became SEC chairman in January 2009, the SEC was “underfunded and understaffed . . . We were behind, and falling further behind”), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110910mls.htm; Testimony by Lynn Turner, Former SEC Chief Accountant, at a hearing on “Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis,” before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (July 12, 2011), at 5, 13 (stating that one reason why CFTC and SEC were “ineffective” during the decade leading up to the financial crisis was that both agencies “lacked adequate funding and resources”; in particular, “SEC was essentially starved by Congress of necessary resources during much of the 1990s,” and SEC again lacked adequate funding between 2005 and 2007), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=cd29c589-0882-4468-b4be-96f53902b567; “Memo to Congress: It’s time for SEC to be self-funded,” Investment News, May 16, 2011, at 0008 (stating that “SEC has been chronically underfunded for years”) (available on Lexis); Richard Sansom, “Republicans’ return to power threatens CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank,” SNL Daily Gas Report, Jan. 12, 2011 (reporting that “CFTC has been underfunded for at least a decade”).


approved major increases in their budgets. Republican leaders and the financial services industry did not disagree with these gloomy assessments of the likely impact of budget stringency on the two agencies. Rather, they seem determined to “defang Dodd-Frank” by “squeezing [CFTC and SEC] through the budget process.”

As discussed above, Republican legislators and major banks took a very different position when they pushed for legislation to create FHFA as a new and more powerful regulator for Fannie and Freddie. Republicans and their banking allies insisted that FHFA must have an independent, secure funding source that was not subject to congressional appropriations. They pointed out that Fannie and Freddie had frequently used their political clout to persuade Congress to cut OFHEO’s budget and thereby undermine OFHEO’s enforcement efforts. Representative Richard Baker (R-LA), a leading proponent of legislation to establish FHFA, declared that OFHEO “historically has been impaired” because it “must come to the Congress for its funding.” Baker emphasized the importance of creating “an independently funded

295 See Snell, supra note 291 (reporting that CFTC chairman Gensler’s “worries” about his agency’s ability to implement Dodd-Frank with a constrained budget “are music to the industry”).
296 Id. For other commentators expressing the same view, see, e.g., Carton, supra note 291; Cohan, supra note 293; Stewart, supra note 293.
297 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (describing support by Republicans and major banks for establishment of FHFA as a more powerful regulator for Fannie and Freddie).
298 151 Cong. Rec. H 9131 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2005) (remarks of Rep. Baker). In the following passage, a prominent journalist described how Fannie’s supporters in Congress used the appropriations process to hamstring OFHEO’s supervisory effort:

Fannie’s allies in Congress . . . made sure that . . . OFHEO, unlike any other [financial] regulator, would be subject to the appropriations process, meaning its funding was at the mercy of politicians – politicians who often took their cues from Fannie. [¶] Not surprisingly, OFHEO was a notoriously weak regulator.
regulator, with all the tools a modern regulator should have to oversee vastly complex financial enterprises to protect the American taxpayer from unwarranted losses.”299 The final legislation established FHFA as a “strong, independent regulator” funded by assessments collected from the GSEs, and the legislation stipulated that FHFA would not be subject to the appropriations process.300

In creating CFPB, Congress drew directly on FHFA’s secure funding model. The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank declared that “the assurance of adequate funding [from the Fed], independent of the Congressional appropriations process, is absolutely essential to the independent operations of any financial regulator.”301 The Senate report pointed out that the need for independent funding of financial regulators

was a hard learned lesson from the difficulties faced by [OFHEO], which was subject to repeated Congressional pressure because it was forced to go through the annual appropriations process. It is widely acknowledged that this helped limit OFHEO’s effectiveness. For that reason, ensuring that OFHEO’s successor agency . . . would not be subject to appropriations was a high priority for the Committee and the Congress in [passing] the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.302

Several Republican leaders who are pushing for legislation to subject CFPB to the appropriations process were strong proponents of secure funding for FHFA.303 It is therefore very difficult to identify any persuasive rationale for the attempt to remove CFPB’s budgetary


299 Id.
302 Id.
303 Davidson, *supra* note 141 (noting that Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL), Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Ed Royce (R-CA) and other current Republican House members supported legislation to establish a GSE regulator whose funding would not be subject to congressional appropriations).
independence beyond the desire “to undercut an agency [Republican leaders] never liked to begin with.”

V. Conclusion

Congress decided to establish CFPB after concluding that federal bank regulators repeatedly failed to protect consumers during the credit boom leading up to the financial crisis. Because of the prudential regulators’ systematic failures to protect consumers, Congress vested CFPB with sole responsibility and clear accountability for implementing effective consumer safeguards. Title X of Dodd-Frank authorizes CFPB to issue regulations, conduct investigations and prosecute enforcement proceedings to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, abusive and discriminatory financial practices. Title X promotes CFPB’s independence from political influence by granting CFPB autonomy in its policymaking, rulemaking and enforcement functions and by giving CFPB an assured source of funding from the Fed.

The financial services industry and most Republican members of Congress vehemently opposed CFPB’s creation, and they have sought to prevent CFPB from implementing its mandate under Title X. In July 2011, the Republican-controlled House passed legislation that would fundamentally change CFPB’s governance, authority and funding. That legislation would seriously undermine CFPB’s autonomy and effectiveness by (i) changing CFPB’s leadership structure from a single Director to a five-member commission, (ii) giving federal prudential regulators a greatly enhanced veto power over CFPB’s rules, and (iii) requiring CFPB to obtain congressional appropriations to fund its operations. Republican Senators have declared that they will block confirmation of any CFPB Director until the Senate approves legislation making the same three changes. In the meantime, CFPB cannot effectively regulate nondepository providers of financial services or exercise many of powers delegated to CFPB by Title X.

304 Id.
The financial services industry and Republican leaders have justified their campaign against CFPB by claiming that the bureau has unprecedented powers as well as a unique structure that is unaccountable to the political branches. In fact, as shown above, CFPB’s structure and powers closely resemble those of other federal financial regulators, particularly FHFA and OCC. Major banks and their legislative supporters strongly supported the creation of FHFA in 2008 and emphasized FHFA’s need for sweeping powers and an independent funding source that would not be subject to congressional control. Similarly, large banks and Republican leaders have consistently and vigorously defended OCC’s authority and autonomy.

Moreover, CFPB is hardly an unaccountable agency. CFPB must consult with a wide variety of outside parties before issuing regulations. Congress has extensive powers to oversee CFPB’s operations, and FSOC may review and set aside CFPB’s regulations. Accordingly, it seems clear that the financial services industry and its political allies oppose CFPB because of its statutory mission, not its structure.

Large financial firms evidently fear that they cannot exercise the same degree of political influence over CFPB that they have successfully deployed in the past with regard to prudential regulators. In the financial industry’s view, CFPB is likely to act independently and conscientiously in carrying out its mandate to protect consumers from predatory financial practices. Congress should want that result. The financial crisis has shown convincingly that a systematic failure to protect consumers will eventually threaten the stability of our financial system as well as our general economy. Congress should therefore preserve CFPB’s existing authority and autonomy despite the determined attacks of the financial services industry and its Republican allies.